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Abstract
We consider the problem of optimal dynamic information acquisition from many
correlated information sources. Each period, the decision-maker jointly takes an action
and allocates a fixed number of observations across the available sources. His payoff
depends on the actions taken and on an unknown state. In the canonical setting of
jointly normal information sources, we show that the optimal dynamic information
acquisition rule proceeds myopically after finitely many periods. If signals are acquired
in large blocks each period, then the optimal rule turns out to be myopic from period 1.
These results demonstrate the possibility of robust and “simple” optimal information
acquisition, and simplify the analysis of dynamic information acquisition in a widely
used informational environment.
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1 Introduction
In a classic problem of sequential information acquisition, a Bayesian decision-maker (DM)
repeatedly acquires information and takes actions. His payoff depends on the sequence of
actions taken, as well as on an unknown payoff-relevant state. We consider a setting in
which the DM acquires information from a limited number of flexibly correlated information
sources, and allocates a fixed number of observations across these sources each period. The
optimal strategy for information acquisition is of interest.
Neglecting dynamic considerations, a simple strategy is to acquire at each period the
signal (or the set of signals) that maximally reduces uncertainty about the payoff-relevant
state. We refer to this as the myopic (or greedy) rule, as it is the optimal rule if the DM
mistakenly believes each period to be the last possible period of information acquisition.
This myopic rule turns out to possess strong optimality properties in a widely used setting.
Suppose that the available signals are jointly normal. If signal observations are acquired in
sufficiently large blocks each period, then myopic information acquisition is optimal from
period 1 (Theorem 1). We provide a sufficient condition on the required size of the block;
this condition depends on primitives of the informational environment but not on the payoff
function. Theorem 2 characterizes a condition on the prior and signal structure, given which
myopic information acquisition is optimal from period 1 for any block size. In both of these
cases, the optimal information acquisition strategy can be exactly and simply characterized.
Additionally, instead of solving for the optimal decision rule and information acquisition
strategy jointly (as would otherwise be required), our results show that one can separate
these two problems, and solve for the optimal decision rule in this setting as if information
acquisition were exogenous.
Finally, for generic signal structures, and for any block size, the optimal strategy proceeds
by myopic acquisition after finitely many periods (Theorem 3). These results hold across all
payoff functions (and in particular, independently of discounting); thus, myopic information
acquisition is (eventually) “robustly” best.
Why does the myopic rule perform so well? The main inefficiency of myopic planning is
that it neglects potential complementarities across signals. A signal that is individually un-
informative can be very informative when paired with other signals; thus, repeated (greedy)
acquisition of the best single signal need not result in the best sequence of signals.1 A
key observation is that whether the DM perceives two signals as providing complementary
1See Section 4.1 for a concrete example and further discussion.
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information depends on his current belief over the state space.2 This means that comple-
mentarities across signals are not intrinsic to the underlying signal correlation structure:
As the DM’s beliefs about the states evolve, so too do his perceptions of the correlations
across signals. It is clear that as information accumulates, the DM’s beliefs become more
precise about each of the unknown states. This does not itself lead to optimality of myopic
information acquisition (see Section 4.2 for more detail). We show that the key force comes
from a second effect of information accumulation: The DM’s beliefs evolve in such a way
that the signals endogenously de-correlate from his perspective, and are eventually perceived
as providing approximately independent information. At the limit in which all signals are
independent, the value of any given signal can be evaluated separately of the others. The
dynamic problem is thus “separable,” and can be replaced with a sequence of static prob-
lems. Given sufficiently many signal observations, we have only approximate separability,
which we show is sufficient for the myopic rule to be optimal.
The mechanism we identify is different from the one underlying a classic result from
the experimentation literature. In “learning by experimentation” settings, myopic behavior
is eventually near-optimal: in the long run, the DM’s beliefs converge, so the value of
exploration (i.e. learning) becomes second-order relative to the value of exploitation of the
perceived best arm.3 In our paper, signal acquisition decisions are driven by learning concerns
exclusively, as there is by design no exploitation incentive. To see this, recall that in the
classic multi-armed bandit problem (Gittins, 1979; Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2008), actions
play the dual role of influencing the evolution of beliefs and also determining flow payoffs. In
our setting (which does not fall into the multi-armed bandit framework), there is a separation
between signal choices, which influence the evolution of beliefs, and actions, which determine
(unobserved) payoffs. Myopic signal choices become optimal in our framework because they
maximize the speed of learning, and not because they optimize a tradeoff between learning
and payoff. (Additionally, a myopic strategy is immediately optimal in multi-armed bandit
problems only under very restrictive assumptions (Berry and Fristedt, 1988; Banks and
Sundaram, 1992).)
2As a simple example, suppose the payoff-relevant state is θ1, and the available signals are about θ1 + θ2
and θ2. These signals are “complementary” when the agent’s prior belief is that θ1 and θ2 are independent:
observations of the first signal improve the value of observing the second signal, and vice versa. But suppose
the DM’s prior is such that θ2 = θ1; then, these signals in fact become substitutes.
3Easley and Kiefer (1988) and Aghion et al. (1991) show that if there is a unique myopically optimal
policy at the limiting beliefs, then the optimal policies must converge to this policy. In our setting, every
policy (signal choice) is trivially myopic at the limiting beliefs (a point mass at the true parameter), so we
do not have uniqueness and cannot use this argument to identify long-run behavior.
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Our results simplify the analysis of optimal dynamic information acquisition in an in-
formational environment that is commonly used in economics: normal signals. However,
the core of our analysis—the “endogenous de-correlation” of signals described above—does
not rely on the assumption of normality. As we discuss further in Section 4.1, this de-
correlation derives from a Bayesian version of the Central Limit Theorem, which holds for
arbitrary signal distributions. This suggests that our eventual optimality result (Theorem
3) generalizes.4
We conclude by demonstrating several extensions. To facilitate application of our results,
we extend our environment to a multi-player setting in which individuals privately acquire
information before playing a one-shot game at a random final period. This extension connects
our results to a literature on games with Gaussian information (Hellwig and Veldkamp,
2009; Myatt and Wallace, 2012; Colombo et al., 2014; Lambert et al., 2018).5 We present
corollaries of our main results, and use these to extend results from Hellwig and Veldkamp
(2009) and Lambert et al. (2018) in an online appendix. Finally, we demonstrate extensions
to environments with choice of information “intensity” (the number of signals to acquire
each period), to multiple payoff-relevant states (for a class of prediction problems) and to a
continuous-time setting.
Our work primarily builds on a large literature about optimal dynamic information ac-
quisition (Moscarini and Smith, 2001; Fudenberg et al., 2018; Che and Mierendorff, 2018;
Mayskaya, 2017; Steiner et al., 2017; He´bert and Woodford, 2018; Zhong, 2018) and a related
literature on sequential search (Wald, 1947; Arrow et al., 1949; Weitzman, 1979; Callander,
2011; Ke and Villas-Boas, 2017; Bardhi, 2018). In contrast to an earlier focus on optimal
stopping and choice of signal precision, our framework characterizes choice between differ-
ent kinds of information, as in the work of Fudenberg et al. (2018) (where the sources are
two Brownian motions), and Che and Mierendorff (2018) and Mayskaya (2017) (where the
sources are two Poisson signals).6 Compared to this work, we allow for many (i.e. more than
4Specifically, we conjecture that for general signals, the optimal rule eventually proceeds myopically when
we restrict to certain decision problems (e.g. prediction of the payoff-relevant state). Immediate optimality
of the myopic rule given sufficiently many signals, and also the independence of our results to the payoff
function, do rely on properties of the normal environment (see Section 4.3 for further details).
5For games of information acquisition beyond the Gaussian setting, see e.g. Persico (2000), Bergemann
and Va¨lima¨ki (2002), Yang (2015) and Denti (2018). All of these papers restrict to a single signal choice.
6Che and Mierendorff (2018) and Mayskaya (2017) consider choice between two Poisson signals, each
of which provides evidence towards/against a binary-valued state. The Poisson model (with a finite state
space) is more suited to applications such as learning about whether a defendant is guilty or innocent, while
the Gaussian model describes for example learning about the (real-valued) return to an investment.
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two) sources with flexible correlation.7
Another strand of the literature considers a DM who chooses from completely flexible
information structures at entropic (or more generally, “posterior-separable”) costs, such as
in Steiner et al. (2017), He´bert and Woodford (2018) and Zhong (2018). Compared to these
papers, our DM has access to a prescribed and limited set of signals.8
Finally, acquisition of Gaussian signals whose means are linear combinations of unknown
states appears previously in the work of Meyer and Zwiebel (2007) and Sethi and Yildiz
(2016). In particular, Sethi and Yildiz (2016) characterizes the long-run behavior of a DM
who myopically acquires information from experts with independent biases. See Section 7
for remaining connections to the literature. See Section 7 for remaining connections to the
literature.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Model
Time is discrete. At each time t = 1, 2, . . . , the DM first chooses from among K information
sources, and then chooses an action at from a set At.
9
The DM’s payoff U(a1, a2, . . . ; θ1) is an arbitrary function that depends on the sequence
of action choices and a payoff-relevant state θ1 ∈ R. We assume that payoffs are realized
only at an (exogenously or endogenously determined) end date; thus, the information sources
described below are the only channel through which the DM learns. This assumption distin-
guishes our model from multi-armed bandit problems, see Section 7 for further discussion.
Stylized cases of such decision problems include:
Exogenous Final Date. An action is taken just once at a final period T that is determined
by an arbitrary distribution over periods.10 The DM’s payoff is U(a1, a2, . . . ; θ1) = uT (aT , θ1)
7Callander (2011) also emphasizes correlation across different available signals. But the signals in Callan-
der (2011) are related by a Brownian motion path, which yields a special correlation structure. Similar
models are studied in Garfagnini and Strulovici (2016) and in Bardhi (2018).
8In Section 6.1, we do allow the DM to also control the intensity of information acquisition by endogenously
choosing how many signals to acquire in each period. But even in that extension, we assume that the incurred
information cost is a function of the number of observations. This is analogous to Moscarini and Smith (2001)
and is distinguished from the above papers that measure information cost based on belief changes.
9Thus, the action at can be based on the information received in period t. The timing of these choices is
not important for our results.
10Special cases include geometric discounting, in which every period (conditional on being reached) has a
constant probability of being final, as well as Poisson arrival of the final period.
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where T is the (random) final time period, and aT is the action chosen in that period. The
time-dependent payoff function uT (aT , θ1) may incorporate discounting.
Endogenous Stopping with Per-Period Costs. Take each action at to specify both the
decision of whether to stop, and also the action to be taken if stopped. The DM’s payoff
is U(a1, a2, . . . ; θ1) = uT (aT , θ1) where T is the (endogenously chosen) final time period,
and aT is the action chosen in that period. The payoff-function uT (aT , θ1) may incorporate
discounting and/or a per-period cost to signal acquisition. Costs are fixed across sources in
a given period, but can vary across periods.11
Apart from the decision problem, there are K information sources, which depend on the
unknown and persistent state vector θ = (θ1, . . . , θK)
′ ∼ N (µ0, V 0).12 This vector includes
the payoff-relevant unknown θ1 and additionally K−1 payoff-irrelevant unknowns θ2, . . . , θK .
The role of these auxiliary states is to permit correlations across the information sources
conditional on θ1; this allows, for example, for the sources to be afflicted by common and
persistent biases. In each period, the DM chooses B sources (allowing for repetition), where
B ∈ N+ is interpreted as a fixed time/attention constraint (see Section 6.1 for extension to
endogenous choice of B). Choice of source k = 1, . . . , K produces an observation of
Xk = 〈ck, θ〉+ k, k ∼ N (0, σ2k)
where the coefficient vectors ck = (ck1, . . . , ckK)
′ and signal variances σ2k are fixed (and
known), but the Gaussian error terms are independent across realizations and sources.
Throughout, we use C to denote the matrix of coefficients whose k-th row is c′k.
We impose the following assumption on the informational environment:
Assumption 1 (Non-Redundancy). The matrix C has full rank, and no proper subset of
row vectors of C spans the coordinate vector e′1. Equivalently, the inverse matrix C
−1 exists,
and its first row consists of non-zero entries.
Heuristically, this means that the DM can and must observe each source infinitely often to
recover the value of the payoff-relevant state θ1. Since in this paper we restrict the number of
sources to be the same as the number of unknown states, the above assumption is generically
satisfied.13,14
11See e.g. Fudenberg et al. (2018) and Che and Mierendorff (2018) for recent models with constant waiting
cost per period.
12Here and later, we exclusively use the apostrophe to denote vector or matrix transpose.
13Throughout, “generic” means with probability 1 for randomly drawn coefficient matrices C.
14Although we have assumed that the number of sources and signals are the same, our results extend
to cases in which there are fewer sources than states, so long as e′1 is spanned by the whole set of signal
coefficient vectors and not by any proper subset.
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Assumption of no redundant sources simplifies our analysis, as it guarantees that all
sources will be sampled infinitely often under the criteria we consider. With redundant
sources, a new question emerges regarding which subset of sources the DM will choose from.
Characterization of that subset is the focus of Liang and Mu (2018).
2.2 Interpretations
We provide below several interpretations of this framework.
News Sources with Correlated Biases. On election day T , a DM will choose which of two
candidates I and J to vote for, where his payoff depends on θ1 = vI − vJ , the difference
between the candidates’ qualities vI and vJ . In each period up to time T , the DM can
acquire information from different news sources. All sources provide biased information, and
moreover the biases are correlated across the sources. As the DM acquires information, he
learns not only about the payoff-relevant state θ1, but also how to de-bias (and aggregate)
information from the various news sources.
Attribute Discovery. A product has K unknown attributes θ˜1, . . . , θ˜K . Its value θ1 is
some arbitrary linear combination of these attribute values. For example, the DM may want
to learn the value of a conglomerate composed of several companies, where each company i
is valued at θ˜i and the value of the conglomerate is θ1 := α1θ˜1 + · · · + αK θ˜K . The DM has
access to (noisy) observations of different linear combinations of the attributes; for example,
he might have access to evaluations of each θ˜i individually.
15 At some endogenously chosen
end time, the DM decides whether or not to invest in the conglomerate.
Sequential Polling. A polling organization seeks to predict the average opinion in the
population towards an issue. There are K demographic groups in the population, and
opinions in demographic group k are normally distributed with unknown mean µk and known
variance σ2k. The fraction of the population in each demographic group k is pk, so the average
opinion is θ1 :=
∑
k pkµk. It is not feasible to directly sample individuals according to the
true distribution pk, but the organization can sample individuals according to other non-
representative distributions pˆk 6= pk. Each period, the polling organization allocates a fixed
budget of opinion samples across the available distributions (polling technologies), and posts
a prediction for θ1. Its payoff is the average prediction error across some fixed number of
periods.
Intertemporal Investment. Each action at is a decision of how to allocate capital between
consumption, and two investment possibilities: a liquid asset (bond), and an illiquid asset
15This model can be rewritten in our framework above, where the state vector is (θ1, θ˜2, . . . , θ˜K).
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(pension fund). The return to the liquid asset is known: 1 dollar saved today is worth
er dollars tomorrow. The return to the illiquid asset is unknown, and it is the payoff-
relevant state in the worker’s problem; that is, every dollar invested today in the pension
fund deterministically yields eθ1 dollar(s) tomorrow. The worker works for T periods, and in
each of these periods he learns about θ1 (from some information sources) and then allocates
his wealth across consumption, saving and investment. In period T + 1, the worker retires
and receives all the returns from his investments into the illiquid asset. His objective is to
maximize the aggregated sum of his discounted consumption utilities and the payoff after
retirement.16
3 (Eventual) Optimality of Myopic Rule
3.1 Myopic Information Acquisition
A strategy consists of an information acquisition strategy and a decision strategy. An infor-
mation acquisition strategy is a measurable map from possible histories of signal realizations
to multi-sets of B signals, and a decision strategy is a map from histories to actions.
We will say that an information acquisition strategy is myopic if it proceeds by choosing
signals that maximally reduce (next period) uncertainty about the payoff-relevant state.
Definition 1. An information acquisition strategy is myopic, if at every next period, it
prescribes choosing the B signals that (combined with the history of observations) lead to the
lowest posterior variance about θ1.
Note that the B signals which minimize the posterior variance also Blackwell dominate any
other multi-set of B signals (see e.g. Hansen and Torgersen (1974)). Thus, myopic acquisition
is optimal if the current period is the last chance for information acquisition, and this is true
no matter what the payoff function is.
Our results below reveal a close relationship between the optimal information acquisition
strategy and the myopic information acquisition strategy. We do not pursue a character-
ization of the optimal decision strategy, which in general depends on the payoff function,
16An important assumption of this example is that the return to investment is deterministic and only
observed at the end. However, our model and results extend to a situation where there are “free” signals
arriving each period that do not count toward the capacity constraint B. By considering the realized log
return as a particular free signal, the extension of our model covers the case where investment returns are
stochastic and the DM observes past return realizations.
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although we point out one application of our main results towards simplification of this
characterization.
3.2 Main Results
We present three results regarding optimality of the myopic information acquisition rule:
Theorem 1 says that myopic information acquisition is optimal from period 1 if B (the
number of signals acquired each period) is sufficiently large. Our next two results hold
for arbitrary B: Theorem 2 provides a sufficient condition on the prior and the coefficient
matrix C under which myopic information acquisition is optimal from period 1, and Theorem
3 states that the optimal rule is eventually myopic in generic environments.
Theorem 1 (Immediate Optimality under Many Observations). Fix any prior and signal
structure, and suppose B is sufficiently large. Then the DM has an optimal strategy that
acquires information myopically.17
Optimally, the DM chooses the most informative B signals in the first period based on
his prior, then chooses the most informative B signals in the second period based on his
updated posterior, and so on. Note that since posterior variances are independent of signal
realizations, and we have assumed that there is no feedback from actions, the above myopic
strategy is history-independent, and can be represented as a deterministic signal path. This
implies that instead of solving for the optimal decision strategy and information acquisition
strategy jointly (as would otherwise be required), one can solve for the optimal decision
strategy with respect to an exogenous stream of information.18
We additionally mention that Theorem 1 can be strengthened to optimality of myopic
information acquisition at all histories, including those in which the DM has previously
deviated from the myopic rule. Finally, a precise bound for how large B must be appears in
Section 4.2.
Our next two results hold for arbitrary block sizes B. First, the myopic rule is again
optimal from period 1 in a class of “separable” environments. Let f(q1, . . . , qK) denote the
17Without further assumptions on the payoff function U , we cannot assert strict optimality of the myopic
information acquisition strategy. For instance, this would not be true if there exists a “dominant” action
sequence that maximizes U(a1, a2, . . . ; θ1) for every value of θ1. But in most other cases, strictly more precise
beliefs do lead to strictly higher expected payoffs, which implies unique optimality of the myopic rule.
18An application of this two-step approach (in continuous time) appears in the concurrent work of Fuden-
berg et al. (2018), Section 3.5. See Section 6.3 for a brief discussion of how our model extends to continuous
time.
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DM’s posterior variance about θ1, updating from qi observations of each signal Xi. An
informational environment is separable if its posterior variance function can be decomposed
in the following way:
Definition 2. The informational environment (V 0, C, {σ2i }) is separable if there exist convex
functions g1, . . . , gK and a strictly increasing function F such that
f(q1, . . . , qK) = F (g1(q1) + · · ·+ gK(qK)).
Intuitively, separability ensures that observing signal i does not change the relative value
of other signals, but strictly decreases the marginal value of signal i relative to every other
signal.
Note that separability is not defined directly on the primitives of the informational en-
vironment (V 0, C, and {σ2i }), as it is based instead on the posterior variance function f .
Nevertheless, f can be directly computed from these primitives, and so is not an endogenous
object.
The result below says that myopic information acquisition is optimal in all separable
informational environments.
Theorem 2 (Immediate Optimality in Separable Informational Environments). Suppose the
informational environment is separable. Then for every B ∈ N+, the DM has an optimal
strategy that acquires information myopically.
Separability encompasses several classes of informational environments that are of inde-
pendent interest. For example:
Example (Orthogonal Signals). The DM’s prior is standard Gaussian (V 0 = IK), and the
row vectors of C are orthogonal to one another.19
Example (Multiple Biases). There is a single payoff-relevant state θ1 ∼ N (0, v1). The DM
has access to observations of X1 = θ1+θ2+ · · ·+θK + 1, where each θi (i > 1) is a persistent
“bias” independently drawn from N (0, vi), and 1 ∼ N (0, σ21) is a noise term i.i.d. over time.
Additionally, the DM has access to signals about each bias Xi = θi + i (i > 1), where
i ∼ N (0, σ2i ).20
19This is because the signals are independent from each other, see also Example 2 in Figure 1.
20The DM’s posterior variance about θ1 is given by
f(q1, . . . , qK) = v0 − v
2
0
v0 +
σ21
q1
+
∑K
i=2
(
vi − v
2
i
vi+σ2i /qi
) .
This can be written in the separable form.
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In all remaining cases, optimal signal choices are eventually myopic.
Theorem 3 (Generic Eventual Myopia). Fix any prior covariance V 0 and signal variances
{σ2i }Ki=1. For generic coefficient matrices C, there exists a time T ∗ ∈ N that depends only on
the informational environment. For this T ∗, and for any B and any decision problem, the
DM has an optimal strategy that acquires information myopically after T ∗ periods.
That is, at all late periods, the optimal signal acquisitions are those that maximally reduce
posterior variance in the given period.
The result above tells us that the optimal rule eventually proceeds by myopic signal acqui-
sition; this is different from the statement that acquisition of signals myopically (from period
1) leads to the optimal signal path. We show in Appendix 10.4 that this latter statement
is also true. This complementary result (that the myopic signal path is eventually optimal)
depends critically on Assumption 1 (no redundant signals). In particular, in environments
with redundant signals, it is possible for the myopic and optimal signal paths to eventually
sample from disjoint subsets of signals.21 In contrast, we conjecture that Theorem 3 (the
optimal rule eventually proceeds myopically) extends beyond Assumption 1. We leave this
conjecture as an open question for future work.
4 Discussion
4.1 Intuition for Theorems 1-3
We begin with a simplified argument for two periods and B = 1: Suppose that the best
signal to acquire in period 1 is a part of the best pair of signals to acquire. In this case, no
tradeoffs are necessary across the two periods, and it is optimal in both periods to acquire
information myopically. In general however, signals that are individually uninformative (from
the perspective of period 1) can be very informative as a pair; thus, myopic information
acquisition in the first round can preclude acquisition of the best pair of signals.
At a high level, myopic information acquisition fails to be optimal when there are strong
complementarities across signals. A key part of our argument is that complementarities
“wash out” as information is acquired, so that signals are eventually perceived as providing
21For example, suppose the available signals are X1 = 0.5θ1 + 1, X2 = θ1 + θ2 + 2, X3 = θ1 − θ2 + 3,
where noise terms are standard normal, states are independent, and prior variance about θ2 is larger than
3. Myopic information acquisition (from period 1) leads to exclusive sampling of signal X1, while a patient
DM eventually samples only from X2 and X3. This example is generalized in Liang and Mu (2018).
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(approximately) independent information. After sufficiently many observations, the best
next signal to acquire is (generically) a part of the best next pair of signals to acquire (and
the best batch of B signals, where B is sufficiently large, is always a part of the best batch
of 2B signals).
We now proceed with a more detailed intuition.
Consider a one-shot version of our problem, in which the DM allocates t observations
across the available signals. Define a t-optimal “division vector” n(t) to be any optimal
allocation of these signals:
n(t) = (n1(t), . . . , nK(t)) ∈ argmin
(q1,...,qK):qi∈Z+,
∑K
i=1 qi=t
f(q1, . . . , qK)
where ni(t) is the number of observations allocated to signal i. Applying Hansen and Torg-
ersen (1974), this allocation maximizes expected payoffs for any decision.
We study the evolution of the vectors n(t) as the number of observations t varies. If
each count ni(t) increases monotonically in t, then the division vectors (n(t))t≥1 can be
achieved under some sequential sampling rule; moreover, this sampling rule corresponds to
myopic information acquisition.22 A key “dynamic Blackwell” lemma shows that a sequence
of normal signals is better than another sequence (for all decision problems depending on
θ1) if and only if it leads to lower posterior variances at every period.
23 Thus, optimality
of myopic information acquisition directly follows from existence of a sequence (n(t))t≥1 of
monotonically increasing division vectors.
Existence of such a sequence depends on whether there are strong complementarities
across signals. In Example 2 of Figure 1, signals are “independent,” and any allocation that
is as close to balanced across the signals as possible is t-optimal. It is thus possible to find
t-optimal division vectors that evolve monotonically. Theorem 2 generalizes Example 2 to
a class of environments in which n(t) evolve monotonically, and the optimal rule is myopic
from period 1.
In general, the division vectors n(t) need not be monotone, as shown in Example 1 of
Figure 1. Because signals X2 and X3 are strong complements (observation of either increases
the value of observation of the other), we have that n(5) = (4, 1, 0) but n(6) = (3, 2, 1); that
22Proceed by induction: in the first period the myopic rule chooses the signal that minimizes posterior
variance. In the second period, he again wants to minimize posterior variance at the given period; since the
division chosen by the totally optimal rule is best and feasible given the period 1 choice, this is what myopic
information acquisition will yield. So on and so forth.
23This generalizes a result from Greenshtein (1996), see Section 7 for further discussion.
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✓1, ✓2, ✓3 ⇠i.i.d. N (0, 1)
X1 = ✓1 + ✏1
X2 = ✓2 + ✏2
X3 = ✓3 + ✏3
✓1 + ✓2 + ✓3Payoff-relevant state:
Example 2
“independent” signal structure
independent prior
✓1, ✓2, ✓3 ⇠i.i.d. N (0, 1)
X1 = ✓1  ✓2 + ✏1
X2 = ✓2 ✓3 + ✏2
X3 = ✓3 + ✏3
✓1Payoff-relevant state:
Example 1
complementarities across signals
independent prior
✓˜1, ✓˜2, ✓˜3 ⇠i.i.d. N (0,⌃)
X1 = ✓˜1 + ✏1
X2 = ✓˜2 + ✏2
X3 = ✓˜3 + ✏3
✓˜1 + ✓˜2 + ✓˜3Payoff-relevant state:
Example 1’
“independent” signal structure
correlated prior
beliefs over “de-corree” 
“de-correlate” as number of 
observations increase
(✓˜1, ✓˜2, ✓˜3)
Figure 1
is, after four signal acquisitions, the best next signal to acquire is X1, but the best pair of
signals to acquire is {X2, X3}. The optimal allocation of six signals is not achievable from
the best allocation of five signals.24
An important step in our proofs is to show that environments which start off like Example
1 necessarily become “like” Example 2 (as observations of each signal accumulate). To
facilitate this comparison, rewrite Example 1 in the following way: Define a new set of states
θ˜1 = θ1 − θ2, θ˜2 = θ2 − θ3, and θ˜3 = θ3. The original prior over (θ1, θ2, θ3) defines a new
prior over (θ˜1, θ˜2, θ˜3), and the original payoff-relevant state can be re-expressed in the new
states as θ1 = θ˜1 + θ˜2 + θ˜3. The signal structure in Example 1’ is the same as in Example
2, with the crucial difference that the prior is correlated in Example 1’ and independent in
Example 2. Given sufficiently many observations of each signal in Example 1’, however, the
DM’s posterior beliefs over (θ˜1, . . . , θ˜K) become almost independent. That is, not only does
learning about each θ˜k occur, but the states θ˜k “de-correlate.” Thus, eventually the signals
24To see these are the t-optimal divisions, we calculate that at t = 5, f(4, 1, 0) = 1123 <
14
29 = f(3, 1, 1) =
f(3, 2, 0). Whereas at t = 6, f(3, 2, 1) = 511 <
17
37 = f(4, 1, 1) = f(4, 2, 0).
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can be viewed as approximately independent.
The above heuristic statements about de-correlation roughly follow from a Bayesian ver-
sion of the Central Limit Theorem. We establish a technical lemma (Lemma 2 in Appendix
9.1) that strengthens this with a comparison of the value of different signals. Specifically,
we characterize the externality that observation of a given signal Xi has on the marginal
value of future observations. We show that the effect of observing Xi on the value of future
observations of Xi (eventually) far outweighs its effect on future observations of any Xj,
j 6= i. That is, the only effect that observation of Xi can have on the ranking of signals is
by reducing the position of signal i. This property is immediate when the covariance matrix
is the identity (as in Example 2), and holds also when the covariance matrix is close to
diagonal (almost independent). At late periods we have a setting much like Example 2, and
the problem is “near-separable.”
Now finally, observe that the transformation we used to rewrite Example 1 as Example 1’
was not special. Indeed, we can rewrite any signal structure in the following way: For each
signal k, define a new state θ˜k = 〈ck, θ〉, so that the signal Xk is simply θ˜k plus independent
Gaussian noise. Under Assumption 1 (no redundant signals), the payoff-relevant state can
be rewritten as a unique linear combination of the transformed states θ˜1, . . . , θ˜K , and the
original prior defines a new prior over (θ˜1, . . . , θ˜K). The same assumption allows us to show
each signal is sampled infinitely often. Hence “de-correlation” necessarily occurs.
The arguments above form the core of our proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 3. They
establish that n(t) eventually evolves approximately monotonically.25 We introduce two
different conditions that allow us to strengthen this to (eventual) exact optimality of myopic
information acquisition.
Our first approach is to allow for acquisition of a larger number of signals each period. We
show that in transitioning from the t-optimal division to the (t+ d)-optimal division (where
t is sufficiently large relative to d), if some signal count decreases (failing sequentiality), then
every other signal count increases by at most one. Specifically, taking d = K−1, we can show
that ni(t + K − 1) ≥ ni(t) for every signal i at every period t ≥ T , with T a large number
depending on the informational environment. Thus, given block size B ≥ max{K − 1, T},
the division vectors n(Bt) are attainable using a sequential rule from period 1. Applying the
dynamic Blackwell lemma mentioned earlier, we have that the optimal strategy immediately
follows n(Bt), myopically. This is the intuition behind Theorem 1.
Our second approach quantifies the “typicality” of failures of monotonicity of n(t). (Be-
25See Appendix 10.2 for an example in which n(t) fails to be monotone even when we restrict to arbitrarily
late periods.
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low, assume B = 1 for illustration.) We show that at late periods t, these failures occur
for a purely technical reason: The vectors n(t) eventually seek to approximate an optimal
limiting frequency λ ∈ ∆K−1 across signals, but do so under an integer constraint; and the
best integer approximations to λt may not be monotone.26 A key lemma demonstrates these
integer approximations do (eventually) evolve monotonically for a “measure-1” set of coeffi-
cient matrices C.27 Thus, if the optimal strategy coincides with n(t) at some late period t,
it will follow these t-optimal divisions afterwards.
The last step is to verify that the optimal strategy will coincide with n(t). We argue
that if this were not true, then the DM could “deviate toward the t-optimal divisions”
and (in generic environments) improve the posterior variance at every period, contradicting
optimality of the original strategy. Hence generically, the optimal strategy will eventually
coincide with n(t) and subsequently follow it. This yields Theorem 3.
4.2 Precision vs. Correlation
With sufficiently many observations, the DM’s beliefs simultaneously become more precise
and less correlated, and these two effects are confounded in our main results. It is tempting
to think that Theorem 1 (or Theorem 3) follows from the eventual precision of beliefs.
However, as our discussion above suggests, the key feature is not how precise beliefs are, but
how correlated they are. Specifically, the block size B needed in Theorem 1 depends on how
many observations are required for the transformed states θ˜1, . . . , θ˜K to “de-correlate,” at
which point complementarities across signals are weak.
Below we make this formal with a bound on B. To state our result, we define transformed
states θ˜k =
1
σk
〈ck, θ〉 (dividing through by σk normalizes all error variances to 1), and let V˜
denote the prior covariance matrix over these transformed states. The payoff-relevant state
θ1 can be rewritten as a linear combination of the transformed states: θ1 = 〈w, θ˜〉 for some
fixed payoff weight vector w ∈ RK . In the following result we assume for simplicity that
w = 1 is the vector of ones, although our analysis can be easily adapted to any w.
Proposition 1. Let R denote the operator norm of the matrix (V˜ )−1.28 Suppose w = 1,
then B ≥ 8(R + 1)K1.5 is sufficient for Theorem 1 to hold.
26This is indeed the case for Example 2, see Appendix 10.2 for details.
27The lemma follows from results in Diophantine approximation theory, which studies the extent to which
an arbitrary real number can be approximated by rational numbers.
28The operator norm of a matrix M is defined as ‖M‖op = sup
{
‖Mx‖
‖x‖ : x ∈ RK with x 6= 0
}
.
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Notice that this bound is increasing in the norm of V˜ −1. To interpret this, suppose first
that we adjust the precision of the DM’s prior beliefs over θ˜1, . . . , θ˜K but fix the degree
of correlation, for example by scaling V˜ by a factor less than 1. Then the norm of V˜ −1
increases, and a larger number of signals B is needed. This is because a more precise prior
can be understood as “re-scaling” the state space by shrinking all states towards zero. Since
signal noise is not correspondingly rescaled, each signal now reveals less about the states,
and de-correlation takes longer.
In contrast, suppose we hold prior precision fixed and increase the degree of prior correla-
tion. This would correspond to fixing the diagonal entries of V˜ and increasing the off-diagonal
entries, so that the variances about individual states are unchanged but their covariances
become larger in magnitude. Then the entire matrix V˜ becomes closer to being singular,
the norm of its inverse increases and a larger B is required. That is, a more correlated prior
requires more observations to de-correlate.
Finally, we highlight that Proposition 1 only provides a sufficient condition on the block
size for the myopic rule to be optimal. However, the aforementioned comparative statics
hold not just for the B that we identify, but also for the smallest B that produces the result.
Indeed, these comparative statics are sharp in the continuous-time limit of our model (see
Section 6.3), where doubling the prior precision would also double the capacity B needed for
Theorem 1 to be true.
To summarize, optimality of myopic information acquisition obtains quickly when prior
beliefs are imprecise and not too correlated. Our results suggest that despite the amount of
(residual) uncertainty in these situations, there is not much conflict between short-run and
long-run information acquisition incentives.
4.3 How Important is Normality?
De-correlation. The key part of our argument is that signals eventually de-correlate. This de-
correlation derives from a Bayesian version of the Central Limit Theorem, and does not rely
on special properties of normality. Consider a more general setting with signals Xi = θ˜i + i,
where the noise term i has an arbitrary distribution with zero mean and finite variance.
Then, we have that the suitably normalized posterior distribution over (θ˜1, . . . , θ˜K) converges
towards a standard normal distribution (so that signals are approximately independent). We
thus expect that given sufficiently many observations, our previous comparisons on the value
of information extend beyond normal signals.
But if we drop normality, then our results weaken in the following ways. Specifically, in
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working with general signal distributions, we sacrifice the potential for immediate optimality
of the myopic rule, and also the generality to all intertemporal decisions.
Immediate Optimality of the Myopic Rule. For normal signals, we established a T such
that given T observations of each signal, the posterior covariance matrix (over the trans-
formed states) is almost independent. Notably, this bound holds uniformly across all his-
tories of signal realizations, thanks to the fact that posterior variances do not depend on
signal realizations under normality. As mentioned above, we can use a Bayesian Central
Limit Theorem to argue a similar property for other signal distributions. The difference is
that the CLT gives us (near) independence almost surely, so that at every period t, there
is still positive probability (albeit vanishing as t increases) that the normalized posterior
covariance matrix is very different from the identity. This precludes us from demonstrating
a block size B given which the optimal rule would be myopic from period 1 (Theorem 1).
For general signal distributions, we thus conjecture that almost surely the optimal rule is
eventually myopic, but do not know what conditions would produce immediate optimality
of the myopic rule.
General Intertemporal Payoffs. The place where we rely most heavily on normality is the
statement that our results hold for all payoff criteria that depend only on θ1 (and actions).
Indeed, when payoff-relevant uncertainty is one-dimensional (as it is here), then all normal
signals can be Blackwell-ordered based on their posterior variances. We use this fact in
Section 3.1 when we define the myopic rule to maximize reduction in posterior variance. We
use this fact again in Section 4.1 when we define the t-optimal divisions n(t) without explicit
reference to the payoff function.
Finally, while the above uses of normality are concerned with static decisions (i.e. taking
an action once), we also need normality to be able to compare signal sequences. General-
izing Greenshtein (1996), we show that the ranking of sequences of normal signals is the
same whether we consider the class of static decision problems or the broader class of in-
tertemporal decisions. This equivalence does not hold in general; see Greenshtein (1996) for
a counterexample involving Bernoulli signals.
5 Games with Dynamic Information Acquisition
We now extend our results to a multi-player setting in which individuals privately acquire
information before playing a normal-form game at a random (and exogenously determined)
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end date.29
There are N players (indexed by i), each of whom has access to a set of K signals
X ik = 〈cik, θi〉+ ik.
The state vector θi = (θi1, θ
i
2, . . . , θ
i
K) represents persistent unknown states particular to
player i. Noise terms itk are (normalized to) standard normal and independent across signals,
players and time.
In each period up to and including the final period, each player i acquires B independent
observations of his signals described above, possibly obtaining multiple (independent) real-
izations of the same signal. Signal choices and their realizations are both privately observed.
The final period is determined by an exogenous distribution pi. At this period, agents play
a one-shot incomplete information game, where each player i’s payoff ui(a, ω) depends on
actions a = (a1, . . . , aN) in addition to a payoff-relevant state ω.
We require that the players share a common prior over all states (ω and the player-
specific state vectors (θi)1≤i≤N) with the following conditional independence property: For
each player i, conditional on the value of θi1, both the payoff-relevant state ω and also the
other players’ unknown states (θj)j 6=i are conditionally independent from player i’s own
states θi.30 This ensures that no player i infers anything about ω or about any other player
j’s information beyond what he (player i) learns about θi1, which makes θ
i
1 the only state of
interest for player i.31
For concreteness, we provide examples (adapted from Lambert et al. (2018)) that do and
do not satisfy conditional independence.32
Example 1 (Satisfies Conditional Independence). In addition to the payoff-relevant state ω,
there is a common unknown state ξ, and two player-specific unknown states b1 and b2. All
states are independent. Player 1 has access to observations of ω + ρ1ξ + b1 + 
1
1 (where ρ1 is
a constant) and b1 + 
1
2. Player 2 has access to observations of ω+ ρ2ξ + b2 + 
2
1 (where ρ2 is
a constant) and b2 + 
2
2. To see that this example satisfies Conditional Independence, define
θ11 = ω + ρ1ξ and θ
2
1 = ω + ρ2ξ.
29Reinganum (1983) considers a similar multi-agent model with private information acquisition (specif-
ically, firms engaging in R&D before competing in oligopoly). Her model is further developed by Taylor
(1995) within the context of research tournaments. However, these papers assume perfectly revealing signals
and are thus distinguished from our setting.
30Note that we do not impose conditional independence between ω and the other players’ states.
31Conditional independence is imposed on players’ prior beliefs. However, this implies conditional inde-
pendence for subsequent posterior beliefs; given the value of θi1, each signal is simply a linear combination
of player i’s other states plus noise, thus conditional independence is preserved under updating.
32Example 1 is based on Example OA.3 in Lambert et al. (2018). Example 2 is based on their Example 1.
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Example 2 (Fails Conditional Independence). The payoff-relevant state is ω, and there is
additionally a common unknown state ξ. These states are independent. Player 1 has access
to noisy observations of ω + ξ only. Player 2 has access to noisy observations of both ω and
ξ. Because both states ω and ξ covary with ω + ξ, there is no way to define the second
player’s “state of interest” θ21 that would satisfy Conditional Independence.
We maintain Assumption 1, so that signals are non-redundant (players must observe all
the signals available to them in order to learn θi1). The following result generalizes Theorem
1 and Theorem 2. (Although we do not state it here, Theorem 3 also extends.)
Corollary 1. Suppose B is sufficiently large or the informational environment is separable.
Then there exists a Nash equilibrium of this model where each player acquires information
myopically.
In fact, we show that the myopic information acquisition strategy is dominant in the following
sense: For arbitrary opponent strategies, player i’s best response involves acquiring signals
myopically.
In Appendix 10.1, we apply the above corollary to extend results from Hellwig and Veld-
kamp (2009) and Lambert et al. (2018) to a setting with sequential information acquisition.
6 Extensions
6.1 Endogenous Learning Intensities
The main model imposes an exogenous capacity constraint of B signals per period. Suppose
now that in each period t, the DM can choose to observe any number Nt ∈ Z+ of signal
realizations (which are then optimally allocated across signals). The DM incurs a flow cost
of information acquisition, modeled as κ(Nt) for some increasing cost function κ(·) with
κ(0) = 0. This framework embeds our main model if we define κ(N) = 0 for N ≤ B and
κ(N) =∞ for N > B.
We assume that the DM’s payoff is U(a1, a2, . . . ; θ1)−
∑
t δ
t−1 · κ(Nt) for some discount
factor δ.33 For the special case of endogenous stopping, the payoff function simplifies to
δτ · u(aτ ; θ1)−
τ∑
t=1
δt−1 · κ(Nt)
33Our analysis can accommodate more general payoff functions of the form U(N1, a1, N2, a2, . . . ; θ1).
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whenever the DM stops after τ periods. This is a discrete-time generalization of the frame-
work proposed in Moscarini and Smith (2001), although our focus is on allocation of the
signals instead of choice of intensity level.34
Theorems 1 and 2 generalize to this setting:
Corollary 2. Suppose B is sufficiently large or the informational environment is separable.
Then, even with endogenous learning intensities, the DM has an optimal strategy that chooses
signals myopically.
In the above corollary, “myopic acquisition” means the following: In any period t, given
(endogenous) intensity choice Nt, the optimal acquisitions are the Nt signals that minimize
posterior variance about θ1. We emphasize that while myopic signal choices are optimal,
myopic intensity choices need not be. However, knowing that the signal choices must follow
the myopic path provides a simplifying first step towards the characterization of optimal
intensity levels.
Generic eventual myopia (Theorem 3) also extends, but we omit the details.
6.2 Multiple Payoff-Relevant States
In the main model, the DM’s payoff function depends on a one-dimensional state. Our
results do not extend in general to payoff functions that depend on the full state vector
(θ1, . . . , θK). Loosely, this is because the signals can no longer be Blackwell ordered; thus,
even the statement that the signal which maximally reduces posterior variance is best for
static decision problems has no analogue when multiple states are payoff-relevant.
However, our results do extend for a class of prediction problems. Specifically, suppose
that at an exogenous end date (determined by an arbitrary distribution over periods), the
DM is asked to predict the state vector θ. At this time, he receives a payoff of
−(a− θ)′W(a− θ),
where W is a given positive semi-definite matrix and a ∈ RK is the DM’s prediction.
In such a setting, our main results and their proofs extend essentially without modifi-
cation. To see this, note that when W is diagonal, the DM simply minimizes a weighted
34Moscarini and Smith (2001) has a single state and a single signal (K = 1), so the DM chooses only the
learning intensities Nt. Unlike Moscarini and Smith (2001), we do not characterize the optimal sequence
of intensity choices (Nt)t≥1, but instead show how this problem can be separated from allocation of those
observations across different kinds of sources.
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sum of posterior variances about multiple states. Generalizing Lemma 2 in Appendix 9.1,
we can show that any such objective function exhibits “eventual near-separability,” which
is sufficient to derive Theorem 1 and Theorem 3. When W is not diagonal, we can use
the spectral theorem to write the DM’s objective function as a weighted sum of posterior
variances about some linearly-transformed states. Our proofs still carry through.
6.3 Continuous Time
In a working paper, we analyze a continuous-time version of our problem. In that model,
the DM has B units of attention in total at every point in time. He chooses attention
levels β1(t), . . . , βK(t) subject to βi(t) ≥ 0 and
∑
i βi(t) ≤ B, and then observes K diffusion
processes X1, . . . , XK , whose evolutions are affected by the attention rates in the following
way:
dXi(t) = βi(t) · 〈ci, θ〉 dt+
√
βi(t) dBi,
where each Bi is an independent standard Brownian motion. This formulation can be seen
as a limit of our discrete-time model in the current paper, where we take period length to
zero and also “divide” the signals to hold constant the amount of information that can be
gathered every instant.
In short, all results from this paper extend (and occasionally can be strengthened): the op-
timal rule is eventually myopic in all informational environments (thus dropping the generic
qualifier in Theorem 3); additionally, we provide more permissive sufficient conditions on the
informational environment under which an optimal strategy is myopic from period 1. We
refer the reader to the working paper for more detail.
7 Related Literature
Besides the references mentioned in the introduction, our setting is related to a recent litera-
ture (Bubeck et al., 2009; Russo, 2016) regarding “best-arm identification” in a multi-armed
bandit setting: A DM samples for a number of periods before selecting an arm and receiving
its payoff. In Appendix 10.3, we characterize the optimal information acquisition strategy
for the case of two states (K = 2), which exactly applies to the problem of identifying the
better of two correlated normal arms. However, due to our assumption of an one-dimensional
payoff-relevant state, we are not able to handle more than two arms.35
35With two arms, the DM only cares about the difference in their expected payoffs. Choosing among
more than two arms would involve multi-dimensional payoff uncertainty and a decision problem that is not
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We note that correlation is the key feature of our setting, and are not aware of many
papers that study correlated bandits, either under the classical framework or under best-arm
identification (see Rothschild (1974), Keener (1985) and Mersereau et al. (2009) for a few
stylized cases).
Our results on the comparison of sequential normal experiments (see the discussion in
Section 4, and results in Appendix 9.2) generalize the main result in Greenshtein (1996).
Greenshtein (1996) compares two deterministic (i.e. history-independent) sequences of sig-
nals, where each signal is θ1 plus independent normal noise. His Theorem 3.1 implies that
the former sequence is Blackwell-dominant if and only if its cumulative precision is higher
at every time. Note that this statement does not refer to the prior beliefs, but if we im-
pose a normal prior on θ1, then higher cumulative precision is equivalent to lower posterior
variance. Thus, the result of Greenshtein (1996) coincides with ours when θ1 is the only
persistent state, and when all signals are independent conditional on θ1. Our setting fea-
tures additional correlation across different signals through the persistent (payoff-irrelevant)
states θ2, . . . , θK . Consequently, the dynamic Blackwell comparison in our model depends
on prior beliefs.36 This feature, together with the endogenous choice of signals (which may
be history-dependent), complicates our problem relative to Greenshtein (1996).
Finally, our work is closely related to optimal design, a field initiated by the the early
work of Robbins (1952) (see Chernoff (1972) for a survey). Specifically, the problem of one-
shot allocation of t signals (our t-optimal criterion in Section 4) is equivalent to a Bayesian
optimal design problem with respect to the “c-optimality criterion”, which seeks to minimize
the variance of an unknown parameter. Our analysis is however focused on dynamics, and
we demonstrate here the optimality of “greedy design” for a broad class of (intertemporal)
objectives.
8 Conclusion
A DM learns about a payoff-relevant state by sequentially sampling (batches of) signals from
flexibly correlated Gaussian sources. Under conditions that we provide, myopic information
prediction. As we discussed in 6.2, the lack of a complete Blackwell ordering limits the generalization of our
argument. Incidentally, in related sequential search settings, Sanjurjo (2017), Ke and Villas-Boas (2017) and
Chick and Frazier (2012) also highlight the challenge of characterizing the optimal strategy once there are
at least three alternatives.
36This is already the case for static comparisons, since as the prior beliefs vary, it is not always the same
signal that leads to the lowest posterior variance about θ1.
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acquisition is optimal and robust across all possible payoff functions. Generically, the optimal
strategy eventually acquires signals myopically. These results are robust to extension to
multi-player settings, to endogenous choice of the number of signals to acquire each period,
and to multi-dimensional uncertainty for certain payoff functions.
We conclude with a re-interpretation of the main setting. Suppose there is a sequence of
short-lived decision-makers indexed by time t, each of whom acquires information and then
takes an action at to maximize some private objective ut(at, θ1). All information acquisition
is public.37 A social planner has (an arbitrary) objective function U(a1, a2, . . . ; θ1); thus, his
incentives are misaligned with those of the short-lived decision makers. Our main results
demonstrate conditions under which this mis-alignment is of no consequence. If each DM
acquires sufficiently many signals, or if the environment is separable, then each DM will
acquire exactly the information that the social planner would have wanted. Generically, the
social planner will not be able to improve (at late periods) upon the information that has
been aggregated so far. We generalize this qualitative insight in our companion piece Liang
and Mu (2018) and demonstrate also how it can fail.
37This separates our model from classic social learning frameworks (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al.,
1992), where decision-makers only observe coarse summary statistics of past information acquisitions.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Preliminary Results
9.1.1 Posterior Variance Function
We begin by presenting basic results that are used throughout the appendix. The following
lemma characterizes the posterior variance function f mentioned in the main text, which
maps signal counts to the DM’s posterior variance about the payoff-relevant state θ1.
Lemma 1. Given prior covariance matrix V 0 and qi observations of each signal i, the DM’s
posterior variance about θ1 is given by
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f(q1, . . . , qK) = [V
0 − V 0C ′Σ−1CV 0]11 (1)
where Σ = CV 0C ′ + D−1 and D = diag
(
q1
σ21
, . . . , qK
σ2K
)
. The function f is decreasing and
convex in each qi whenever these arguments take non-negative extended real values: qi ∈
R+ = R+ ∪ {+∞}.
Proof. The expression (1) comes directly from the conditional variance formula for multi-
variate Gaussian distributions. To prove ∂f
∂qi
≤ 0, consider the partial order  on positive
semi-definite matrices so that A  B if and only if A − B is positive semi-definite. As qi
increases, the matrices D−1 and Σ decrease in this order. Thus Σ−1 increases in this order,
which implies that V 0 − V 0C ′Σ−1CV 0 decreases in this order. In particular, the diagonal
entries of V 0 − V 0C ′Σ−1CV 0 are uniformly smaller, so that f becomes smaller. Intuitively,
more information always improves the decision-maker’s estimates.
To prove f is convex, it suffices to prove f is midpoint-convex since the function is clearly
continuous. Take q1, . . . , qK , r1, . . . , rK ∈ R+ and let si = qi+ri2 .39 Define the corresponding
diagonal matrices to be Dq, Dr, Ds. We need to show f(q1, . . . , qK) + f(r1, . . . , rK) ≥
2f(s1, . . . , sK). For this, we first use the Woodbury inversion formula to write
Σ−1 = (CV 0C ′ +D−1)−1 = J − J(J +D)−1J,
with J = (CV 0C ′)−1. Plugging this back into (1), we see that it suffices to show the following
matrix order:
(J +Dq)
−1 + (J +Dr)−1
2
 (J +Ds)−1.
38When M is a matrix, we let Mij denote its (i, j)-th entry.
39We allow the function f to take +∞ as arguments. This relaxation does not affect the properties of f ,
and it is convenient for our future analysis.
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Inverting both sides, we need to show 2 ((J +Dq)
−1 + (J +Dr)−1)
−1  J + Ds. From defi-
nition, Dq + Dr = diag(
q1+r1
σ21
, . . . , qK+rK
σ2K
) = 2Ds. Thus the above follows from the AM-HM
inequality for positive definite matrices, see for instance Ando (1983).
9.1.2 The Matrix Qi
Let us define for each 1 ≤ i ≤ K,
Qi = C
−1∆iiC ′−1 (2)
where ∆ii is the matrix with ‘1’ in the (i, i)-th entry, and zeros elsewhere. We note that
[Qi]11 = ([C
−1]1i)2, which is strictly positive under Assumption 1. These matrices Qi will be
repeatedly used in our proofs.
9.1.3 Order Difference Lemma
Here we establish the asymptotic order for the second derivatives of f .
Lemma 2. As q1, . . . , qK →∞, ∂2f∂q2i is positive with order
1
q3i
, whereas ∂
2f
∂qi∂qj
has order at most
1
q2i q
2
j
for any j 6= i. Formally, there is a positive constant L depending on the informational
environment, such that ∂
2f
∂q2i
≥ 1
Lq3i
and | ∂2f
∂qi∂qj
| ≤ L
q2i q
2
j
.
To interpret, the second derivative ∂2f/∂q2i is the effect of observing signal i on the marginal
value of the next observation of signal i. Our lemma says that this second derivative is
always eventually positive, so that each observation of signal i makes the next observation
of signal i less valuable. The cross-partial ∂2f/∂qi∂qj is the effect of observing signal i on
the marginal value of the next observation of a different signal j, and its sign is ambiguous.
The key content of the lemma is that regardless of the sign of the cross partial, it is
always of lower order compared to the second derivative. In words, the effect of observing a
signal on the marginal value of other signals (as quantified by the cross-partial) is eventually
second-order to its effect on the marginal value of further realizations of the same signal (as
quantified by the second derivative). This is true for any signal path in which the signal
counts q1, . . . , qK go to infinity proportionally, which we will justify later.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 1 that f(q1, . . . , qK) = [V
0 − V 0C ′Σ−1CV 0]11 and therefore
∂2f
∂qi∂qj
= [∂ij(V
0 − V 0C ′Σ−1CV 0)]11 ∂
2f
∂q2i
= [∂ii(V
0 − V 0C ′Σ−1CV 0)]11 (3)
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Using properties of matrix derivatives,
∂ii(Σ
−1) = Σ−1(∂iΣ)Σ−1(∂iΣ)Σ−1 − Σ−1(∂iiΣ)Σ−1 + Σ−1(∂iΣ)Σ−1(∂iΣ)Σ−1. (4)
The relevant derivatives of the covariance matrix Σ are
∂iΣ = −σ
2
i
q2i
∆ii ∂iiΣ =
2σ2i
q3i
∆ii
Plugging these into (4), we obtain ∂ii(Σ
−1) = −2σ2i
q3i
(Σ−1∆iiΣ−1) +O
(
1
q4i
)
. Thus by (3),
∂2f
∂q2i
=
[
−V 0C ′ · ∂
2(Σ−1)
∂q2i
· CV 0
]
11
=
2σ2i
q3i
· [V 0C ′Σ−1∆iiΣ−1CV 0]11 +O( 1q4i
)
. (5)
As q1, . . . , qk → ∞, Σ → CV 0C ′ which is symmetric and non-singular. Thus the matrix
V 0C ′Σ−1∆iiΣ−1CV 0 converges to the matrix Qi defined earlier in (2). From (5) and [Qi]11 >
0, we conclude that ∂
2f
∂q2i
is positive with order 1
q3i
. Similarly, for i 6= j, we have
∂ij(Σ
−1) = Σ−1(∂jΣ)Σ−1(∂iΣ)Σ−1 − Σ−1(∂ijΣ)Σ−1 + Σ−1(∂iΣ)Σ−1(∂jΣ)Σ−1.
The relevant derivatives of the covariance matrix Σ are
∂iΣ = −σ
2
i
q2i
∆ii ∂jΣ = −
σ2j
q2j
∆jj ∂ijΣ = 0
From this it follows that ∂ij(Σ
−1) = O
(
1
q2i q
2
j
)
. The same holds for ∂
2f
∂qi∂qj
because of (3),
completing the proof of the lemma.
9.2 Dynamic Blackwell Comparison
9.2.1 The Lemma
This subsection establishes a dynamic version of Blackwell dominance for sequences of normal
signals. As an overview, we first generalize Greenshtein (1996) and show that a deterministic
(i.e. history-independent) signal sequence yields higher expected payoff than another in every
intertemporal decision problem if (and only if) the former sequence induces lower posterior
variances about θ1 at every period. This will be a corollary of the lemma below, which also
covers strategies that may condition on signal realizations.
We introduce some notation: Since θ1 is the only payoff-relevant state, the DM in our
model only needs to remember the expected value of θ1 and the covariance matrix over all
of the states (that is, expected values of the other states do not matter). Thus, we can
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summarize any history of beliefs by hT = (µ01, V
0; . . . , µT1 , V
T ), with µt1 representing the
posterior expected value of θ1 after t periods and V
t the posterior covariance matrix. Since
the posterior covariance matrix is a function of signal counts, we can also keep track of the
evolution of posterior covariance matrices by a sequence of division vectors. That is, we
will write the history as hT = (µ01, d(0); . . . ;µ
T
1 , d(T )), where each d(t) = (d1(t), . . . , dK(t))
counts the number of each signal acquired by time t. We can then view any information
acquisition strategy S as a mapping from such sequences of expected values and division
vectors to signal choices.
Consider a mapping G˜ from possible sequences of divisions to these sequences themselves:
For each (d(0), . . . , d(T )), G˜ maps to another sequence (d˜(0), . . . , d˜(T )), subject to the fol-
lowing “consistency” requirements. First,
∑
i d˜i(t) = t, meaning that each d˜(t) must be a
possible division at time t. Second, d˜i(t) ≥ d˜i(t − 1), meaning that the sequence d˜ can be
attained via a sequential sampling rule. Lastly, we require
(d˜(0), . . . , d˜(T − 1)) = G˜(d(0), . . . , d(T − 1))
so that nesting sequences are mapped to nesting sequences.
The following lemma says that if d(·) represents the division vectors under an information
acquisition strategy S, and if G˜ is a consistent mapping that uniformly reduces the posterior
variance, then we can find another information acquisition strategy S˜ whose division vectors
are given by d˜(·). Moreover, our construction ensures that S˜ leads to more dispersed posterior
beliefs than S at every period, so that in any decision problem, acquiring signals according
to S˜ is weakly better than S (when actions are taken optimally).
Lemma 3. Fix any information acquisition strategy S and any consistent mapping G˜ defined
above. Suppose that for every sequence of divisions (d(0), . . . , d(T )) realized under S, it holds
that
f(d˜(T )) ≤ f(d(T )).
Then there exists deviation strategy S˜ such that, at every period T , any history hT =
(µ01, d(0); . . . ;µ
T
1 , d(T )) under S can be “associated with” a distribution of histories h˜
T =
(ν01 , d˜(0); . . . ; ν
T
1 , d˜(T )) with the following properties:
1. the probability of hT occurring under S is the same as the probability of its associated
h˜T (integrated with respect to the probability of “association”) occurring under S˜;
2. the total probability that any h˜T is associated to (integrated with respect to different
possible hT ) is 1;
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3. under the association, the distribution of νt1 is normal with mean µ
t
1 and variance
f(d(t))− f(d˜(t)) for each t.
Consequently, for any decision strategy A, there exists another decision strategy A˜ such that
the expected payoff under (S˜, A˜) is no less than the expected payoff under (S,A).
To interpret, the first two properties require that the association relation is a Markov
kernel between histories under S and histories under S˜; this enables us to compare payoffs
under S˜ to those under S. The third property guarantees that the alternative strategy S˜ is
more informative than S.
We note the following corollary, which is obtained from the previous lemma by considering
a constant mapping G˜.
Corollary 3. Define the t-optimal division vectors as in Section 4.1. Suppose each coordinate
of n(Bt) increases in t. Then it is optimal for the DM to achieve n(Bt) at every period.
9.2.2 Proof of Lemma 3
We construct S˜ iteratively as follows. In the first period, consider the signal choice under
S (given the null history). This signal leads to the division d(1). Let S˜ observe the unique
signal that would achieve the division d˜(1).
After the first observation, the DM’s distribution of posterior beliefs about θ1 under S is
θ1 ∼ N (µ11, f(d(1))) with µ11 a normal random variable with mean µ01 and variance f(0) −
f(d(1)). By comparison, the distribution of posterior beliefs under S˜ is θ1 ∼ N (ν11 , f(d˜(1)))
with ν11 drawn from N (µ01, f(0)− f(d˜(1))). Since f(d˜(1)) ≤ f(d(1)), the latter distribution
of beliefs (under S˜) is more informative a la Blackwell. Thus, we can associate each belief
θ1 ∼ N (µ11, f(d(1))) under S with a more informative distribution of beliefs N (ν11 , f(d˜(1)))
under S˜. To be more specific, for fixed µ11, the associated ν
1
1 is distributed normally with
mean µ11 and variance f(d(1)) − f(d˜(1))). Thus by construction, all three properties are
satisfied at period 1. To facilitate the discussion below, we say this distribution of beliefs
under S˜ “imitates” the belief (µ11, f(d(1))) under S.
In the second period, the deviation strategy S˜ takes the current belief (ν11 , f(d˜(1))) and
randomly selects some µ11 (with conditional probabilities under the Markov kernel) to “im-
itate.” That is, given any selection of µ11, find the signal that S would observe in period
2 given belief (µ11, f(d(1))). This signal choice under S leads to the division sequence
(d(0), d(1), d(2)), which is mapped to (d˜(0), d˜(1), d˜(2)). Naturally, we let S˜ observe the signal
that would lead to the division d˜(2). Such a signal is well-defined due to our consistency
requirements on G˜.
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To proceed with the analysis, let us fix µ11 and study the distribution of posterior beliefs
about θ1 after two observations. Under S, the distribution of posterior beliefs is θ1 ∼
N (µ21, f(d(2))) with µ21 normally distributed with mean µ11 and variance f(d(1)) − f(d(2)).
While under S˜, the distribution of posterior beliefs is θ1 ∼ (ν21 , f(d˜(2))) with ν21 drawn from
N (µ11, f(d(1))− f(d˜(2))).40
Since f(d˜(2)) ≤ f(d(2)), the distribution of beliefs under S˜ Blackwell-dominates the
distribution under S, for each µ11. We can thus associate each history (µ
1
1, d(1);µ
2
1, d(2)) under
S with a distribution of histories (ν11 , d˜(1); ν
2
1 , d˜(2)) under S˜, such that the corresponding
beliefs under S˜ are more informative at both periods. Repeating this procedure completes
the construction of S˜, which satisfies all three properties stated in the lemma.
Finally, suppose A is any decision strategy that maps histories to actions. We need to
find A˜ such that the pair (S˜, A˜) does no worse than (S,A). This is straightforward given
what we have done: at any history h˜T under S˜, let h˜T randomly select hT to imitate, and
define A˜(h˜T ) = A(hT ). Then we see that a DM who follows the decision strategy A obtains
the same payoff along any belief history h as another DM who uses the decision strategy A˜
and faces the distribution of belief histories h˜. Integrating over h, we have shown that (S˜, A˜)
achieves the same payoff as (S,A). The lemma is proved.
9.3 Proof of Theorem 1 (Large Block of Signals)
By Corollary 3, it suffices to show that for sufficiently large B, each coordinate n(Bt) is
increasing in t. To do this, we first argue that the signal counts grow to infinity (roughly)
proportionally. In more detail, define
λi =
|[C−1]1i| · σi∑K
j=1|[C−1]1j| · σj
. (6)
Then we will show that for each signal i, ni(t)− λi · t remains bounded even as t→∞.
Indeed, we must at least have ni(t) → ∞; otherwise the posterior variance f(n(t))
would be bounded away from zero, which would contradict the optimality of n(t) since
f(t/K, . . . , t/K)→ 0. Additionally, we compute from (1) that
∂if(n(t)) = −σ
2
i
n2i
· [V 0C ′Σ−1∆iiΣ−1CV 0]11. (7)
40Here we use the following technical result: suppose the DM is endowed with a distribution of prior
beliefs θ ∼ N (µ, V ), with µ1 normally distributed with mean y and variance σ2, then upon observing signal
i and performing Bayesian updating, his distribution of posterior beliefs is θ ∼ N (µˆ, Vˆ ), with µˆ1 normally
distributed with mean y and variance σ2 + [V − Vˆ ]11. This is proved by noting that the DM’s distribution
of beliefs about θ1 must integrate to the same ex-ante distribution of θ1.
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As each ni → ∞, the matrix Σ = CV 0C ′ + D−1 (see Lemma 1) converges to CV 0C ′.
So V 0C ′Σ−1∆iiΣ−1CV 0 converges to the matrix Qi defined in (2). It follows from (7) that
∂if ∼ −σ
2
i
n2i
· [Qi]11 (ratio converges to 1). Since a t-optimal division must satisfy ∂if ∼ ∂jf
(because we are doing discrete optimization, ∂if and ∂jf need only be approximately equal),
we deduce that ni and nj must grow proportionally. Using [Qi]11 = ([C
−1]1i)2, we have
ni(t) ∼ λit.
Next, note that because ni(t) ∼ λit, Σ = CV 0C ′ + D−1 = CV 0C ′ + O(1t ).41 Thus
in fact V 0C ′Σ−1∆iiΣ−1CV 0 converges to Qi at the rate of 1t . From (7), we obtain ∂if =
−σ2i ·[Qi]11+O( 1t )
n2i
. t-optimality gives us the first-order condition ∂if = ∂jf +O(
1
t3
).42 So
λ2i +O(
1
t
)
n2i
=
λ2j +O(
1
t
)
n2j
.
This is equivalent to λ2in
2
j−λ2jn2i = O(t), which yields λinj−λjni = O(1) after factorization.
Hence ni(t) = λi · t+O(1) as we claimed.
Having completed this asymptotic characterization of the t-optimal division vectors, we
will now show that n(t+K − 1) ≥ n(t) (in each coordinate) whenever t is sufficiently large.
Theorem 1 will follow once this is proved.43
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that n1(t + K − 1) ≤ n1(t) − 1. Note we have∑K
i=1(ni(t + K − 1) − ni(t)) = K − 1. So
∑K
i=2(ni(t + K − 1) − ni(t)) ≥ K, and we can
without loss of generality assume n2(t+K−1) ≥ n2(t)+2. To summarize, when transitioning
from t-optimality to t+K − 1-optimality, signal 1 is acquired at least once less and signal 2
at least twice more. Below we will obtain a contradiction by arguing that at period t+K−1,
the posterior variance could be further reduced by observing signal 1 once more and signal
2 once less.
Indeed, let us write ni = ni(t) and n˜i = ni(t+K − 1). Then t-optimality of n(t) gives us
f(n1 − 1, n2 + 1, . . . , nK) ≥ f(n1, n2, . . . , nK).
With a slight abuse of notation, we let ∂if to denote the discrete partial derivative of f :
∂if(q) = f(qi + 1, q−i)− f(q). Then the above display is equivalent to
∂2f(n1 − 1, n2, . . . , nK) ≥ ∂1f(n1 − 1, n2, . . . , nK). (8)
41“Big O” notation has the usual meaning.
42That is, error terms due to discreteness are no larger than 1t3 . We omit the details.
43To be fully rigorous, this only proves Theorem 1 when B is sufficiently large and is a multiple of K − 1.
However, we can similarly show n(t+K) ≥ n(t) for sufficiently large t. The two inequalities n(t+K−1) ≥ n(t)
and n(t+K) ≥ n(t) together are sufficient to deduce Theorem 1 for all large B.
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We claim this implies the following:
∂2f(n˜1, n˜2 − 1, . . . , n˜K) > ∂1f(n˜1, n˜2 − 1, . . . , n˜K). (9)
This would lead to
f(n˜1, n˜2, . . . , n˜K) > f(n˜1 + 1, n˜2 − 1, . . . , n˜K),
which would be our desired contradiction.
It remains to show (8) =⇒ (9). By assumption, we have n˜1 ≤ n1−1, n˜2 ≥ n2 +2 and the
difference between any n˜j and nj is bounded uniformly over t. Thus the LHS of (9) exceeds
the LHS of (8) by (at least) a second derivative ∂22 minus a finite number of cross partial
derivatives ∂2j. By Lemma 2, this difference on the LHS is positive with order
1
t3
. The
difference between the RHS of (9) and the RHS of (8) can be positive or negative, but either
way it has order O( 1
t4
). This shows (9) is a consequence of (8), and the theorem follows.
9.4 Proof of Theorem 2 (Separable Environments)
Suppose the informational environment is separable. We will show n(t) increases in t, which
implies the theorem via Corollary 3.
Note that in a separable environment, the definition of t-optimality reduces to:
n(t) = (n1(t), . . . , nK(t)) ∈ argmin
(q1,...,qK):qi∈Z+,
∑K
i=1 qi=t
K∑
i=1
gi(qi)
where g1, . . . , gK are convex functions.
In this setting, the myopic information acquisition strategy sequentially chooses the signal
i that minimizes the difference gi(qi + 1) − gi(qi), given the current division vector q. But
since the g-functions are convex, the outcome under the myopic strategy coincides with t-
optimality at every period t (This is fairly well known, and it can be proved quickly by
induction.) Hence n(t) can and will be sequentially attained.
9.5 Preparation for the Proof of Theorem 3
9.5.1 Switch Deviations
We now introduce preliminary results that will be used to show that the optimal rule even-
tually proceeds myopically in generic environments. Relative to the proofs of Theorems 1
and 2, the new difficulty that arises is that in general, the optimal information acquisition
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strategy conditions on signal realizations. As a result, the induced division vectors d(·) are
stochastic, and we will need the full power of our dynamic Blackwell lemma.
In what follows, we will apply Lemma 3 using a particular class of mappings G˜.
Definition 3. Fix a particular sequence of divisions (d∗(0), d∗(1), . . . , d∗(t0)). Let i be the
signal observed in period t0 and j be any other signal. An (i, j)-switch mapping G˜ specifies
the following:
1. Suppose T < t0 or d(t) 6= d∗(t) for some t ≤ t0, then let G˜(d(0), . . . , d(T )) be itself.
2. Otherwise T ≥ t0 and d(t) = d∗(t),∀t ≤ t0. If dj(T ) = dj(t0), then let d˜(T ) =
(di(T )− 1, dj(T ) + 1, d−ij(T )). If dj(T ) > dj(t0), then let d˜(T ) = d(T ).
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 . . . st0−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Signals match divisions d∗(0), . . . , d∗(t0 − 1)
Xi st0+1 . . . sτ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
None of these are Xj
Xj sτ+1 . . .
(i, j)-switch
Figure 2: Pictorial representation of an (i, j)-switch based on a sequence of divisions d∗(0), . . . , d∗(t0).
Let us interpret this definition by relating to the resulting deviation strategy S˜ con-
structed in Lemma 3. The first case above says that S˜ only deviates when the history of
divisions is d∗(0), . . . , d∗(t0 − 1) and S is about to observe signal i in period t0. The second
case says that S˜ dictates observing signal j instead at that history; subsequently, S˜ observes
the same signal as S (at the imitated belief) until the first period at which S is about to
observe signal j. If that period exists, the deviation strategy S˜ switches back to observing
signal i and coincides with S afterwards.
The benefit of these “switch deviations” is that their posterior variances can be easily
compared to the original strategy. Specifically, d˜(t) = d(t) except at those histories that
begin with d∗(0), d∗(1), . . . , d∗(t0 − 1) (and before signal j is observed again under S). At
such histories, the posterior variance is strictly lower under S˜ if and only if
f(di(t)− 1, dj(t) + 1, d−ij(t)) < f(d(t)).
Using (absolute values of) the discrete partial derivatives, we can rewrite this condition as
|∂if(di(t)− 1, dj(t), d−ij(t))| < |∂jf(di(t)− 1, dj(t), d−ij(t))|. (*)
We can thus obtain the following corollary:
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Corollary 4. Suppose we can find a history of divisions d(0), . . . , d(t0) realized under S such
that di(t0) = di(t0 − 1) + 1 and moreover (*) holds for all divisions d(t) with dj(t) = dj(t0)
and dk(t) ≥ dk(t0),∀k. Then the switch deviation S˜ constructed above improves upon S.
Note that the condition dj(t) = dj(t0) captures the fact that d˜(t) differs from d(t) only
until signal j is chosen again by S. Meanwhile, dk(t) ≥ dk(t0),∀k holds because we only
compare posterior variances after t0 periods.
9.5.2 Asymptotic Characterization of Optimal Strategy
Below we will use the contrapositive of Corollary 4 to argue that if S is the optimal infor-
mation acquisition strategy, then we cannot find any history of realized divisions such that
(*) always holds. Technically speaking, we might worry that although S˜ strictly improves
upon S in terms of posterior variances, it might achieve the same expected payoff as S (for
instance, when the DM faces a constant payoff function). Nonetheless, by Zorn’s lemma
we can choose S to be an optimal strategy that is additionally “un-dominated” in terms
of posterior variances. With that choice, the deviation S˜ cannot exist, and our arguments
remain valid. (Note that our theorems only state that the DM has an optimal strategy . . . )
To illustrate, we now derive the asymptotic signal proportions for the optimal information
acquisition strategy S.
Lemma 4. Suppose S is the optimal information acquisition strategy, and d(·) is its induced
divisions. Let λk be defined as in (6). In generic informational environments, the difference
dk(T )− λk ·T remains bounded as T →∞, for any realized division d(T ) and each signal k.
Proof. For this proof, we only need the informational environment to be such that each
signal has strictly positive marginal value. That is, for any signal k and any possible division
q, we require
f(qk + 1, q−k) < f(q).
This is “generically” satisfied because any equality f(qk + 1, q−k) = f(q) would impose a
non-trivial polynomial equation over the signal linear coefficients, and the number of such
constraints is at most countable.
Under this genericity assumption, let us first show dk(T )→∞ holds for each signal k, and
the speed of divergence depends only on the informational environment. For contradiction,
suppose this is not true. Then we can find a sequence of histories {hTm} such that Tm →∞
but d1(Tm) remains bounded (these histories need not nest one another). By passing to a
subsequence, we may assume qk = limm→∞ dk(Tm) exists for every signal k, where this limit
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may be infinity. Define I to be the non-empty subset of signals (not including signal 1) with
qk =∞. Furthermore, we assume that the signal observed in the last period of each of these
histories hTm is the same signal i. We also assume i ∈ I; otherwise just truncate the histories
by finitely many periods.
Take any signal j /∈ I (for instance, j = 1 works). Choose Tm sufficiently large and
consider the (i, j)-switch deviation S˜ that deviates from hTm by observing signal j instead
of i in period Tm. We will verify (*) for all possible divisions d(t) with dj(t) = dj(Tm) and
di(t) ≥ di(Tm), which will contradict the optimality of S via Corollary 4. Indeed, note that
as Tm → ∞, di(Tm) → ∞ because i ∈ I. Since di(t) ≥ di(Tm), the LHS of (*) approaches
zero as Tm increases. By comparison, the RHS of (*) is bounded away from zero because
dj(t) = dj(Tm) is bounded, and we assume each signal has strictly positive marginal value.
Hence (*) holds and we have shown that d(T )→∞ in each coordinate.
Next, from (7), we have the following approximations for the partial derivatives:
|∂if(di(t)− 1, dj(t), d−ij(t))| ∼ σ
2
i · [Qi]11
di(t)2
|∂jf(di(t)− 1, dj(t), d−ij(t))| ∼
σ2j · [Qj]11
dj(t)2
.
If lim supt0→∞
di(t0)
dj(t0)
> λi
λj
(recall that λi is proportional to σi ·
√
[Qi]11), then the above
estimates would imply (*) whenever di(t) ≥ di(t0) (because t ≥ t0) and dj(t) = dj(t0). That
would contradict the optimality of S. Hence, lim supt0→∞
di(t0)
dj(t0)
≤ λi
λj
for every pair of signals
i and j. It follows that dk(t0) ∼ λk · t0, ∀k.
Once these asymptotic proportions are proved, we know that the matrix Σ = CV 0C ′ +
D−1 converges to CV 0C ′ at the rate of 1
t
. By (7), we can deduce more precise approximations:
|∂if(di(t)− 1, · · · )| =
σ2i · [Qi]11 +O(1t )
di(t)2
|∂jf(di(t)− 1, · · · )| =
σ2j · [Qj]11 +O(1t )
dj(t)2
.
If di(t0)
dj(t0)
> λi
λj
+ O( 1
t0
), then these refined estimates would again imply (*) whenever di(t) ≥
di(t0) and dj(t) = dj(t0). To avoid the resulting contradiction, we must have
di(t0)
dj(t0)
≤ λi
λj
+
O( 1
t0
) for every signal pair. This enables us to conclude dk(t0) = λk · t0 +O(1) as desired.
9.6 Proof of Theorem 3 (Generic Eventual Myopia)
9.6.1 Outline of the Proof
To guide the reader through this appendix, we begin by outlining the proof of the theorem,
which is broken down into several steps. Throughout, we focus on the case of B = 1 (one
signal each period), but our proof easily extends to arbitrary B. We will first show a simpler
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(and weaker) result that, in generic environments, the number of periods in which the optimal
strategy differs from the t-optimal division has natural density 1. Our proof of this result
is based on the observation that if equivalence does not hold at some time t, there must be
two different divisions over signals for which the resulting posterior variances about θ1 are
within O( 1
t4
) from each other. This leads to a Diophantine approximation inequality, which
we can show only occurs at a vanishing fraction of periods t.
To improve the result and demonstrate equivalence at all late periods, we show that the
number of “exceptional periods” t is generically finite if there are three different divisions
over signals whose posterior variances are within O( 1
t4
) from each other. This allows us
to conclude that in generic environments, the t-optimal divisions eventually monotonically
increase in t.
In such environments, t-optimality can be achieved at every late period. Thus, whenever
t-optimality obtains in some late period, it will be sustained in all future periods. Since we
have already established that the optimal strategy achieves t-optimality infinitely often, we
conclude equivalence at all large t.
We highlight that in this appendix, we use a slightly different notion of “generic” where
we fix the signal coefficient matrix C and instead (randomly) vary the signal variances {σ2i }.
This concept implies (and is stronger than) the previous genericity concept defined on C.
9.6.2 Equivalence at Almost All Times
We begin by proving a weaker result, that the optimal strategy induces the t-optimal division
n(t) at almost all periods t.
Proposition 2. Suppose the informational environment (V 0, C, {σ2i }) has the property that
for any i 6= j, the ratio λi
λj
is an irrational number. Then, at a set of times with natural
density 1,44 d(t) = n(t) (which is unique) holds for every decision problem. In particular,
the optimal strategy induces a deterministic division vector at such times.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that d1(T ) ≥ n1(T ) + 1 and d2(T ) ≤ n2(T ) − 1. Consider
the last period t0 ≤ T in which the optimal strategy observed signal 1. Then
d1(t0) = d1(T ) ≥ n1(T ) + 1; d2(t0) ≤ d2(T ) ≤ n2(T )− 1.
Using the contrapositive of Corollary 4 with the (1, 2)-switch, we know that (*) cannot
always hold. Thus there exists a division d(t) such that the inequality (*) is reversed. That
44Formally, for any set of positive integers A, let A(N) count the number of integers in A no greater than
N . Then we define the natural density of A to be limN→∞
A(N)
N , when this limit exists.
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is, we can find a division d(t) with d1(t) ≥ d1(t0) and d2(t) = d2(t0) such that (getting rid of
the absolute values)
∂1f(d1(t)− 1, d2(t), d−12(t)) ≤ ∂2f(d1(t)− 1, d2(t), d−12(t)). (10)
On the other hand, t-optimality of n(t) gives us
∂1f(n1(T ), n2(T )− 1, n−12(T )) ≥ ∂2f(n1(T ), n2(T )− 1, n−12(T )). (11)
Note that d2(t) = d2(t0) implies t− t0 is bounded (due to Lemma 4). On the other hand,
we have d1(t) = d1(T0) by construction (t0 is the last period signal 1 was observed). Hence
t0 − T is also bounded. Combining both, we deduce t − T must be bounded. Applying
Lemma 4 again, we know that any difference di(t)− ni(T ) is bounded.
Now because d1(t) − 1 ≥ d1(t0) − 1 ≥ n1(T ), the LHS of (10) has size at least the LHS
of (11) minus a finite number of cross partial derivatives ∂1j. Similarly, the RHS of (10) is
at most bigger than the RHS of (10) by a number of cross partials. Together with the order
difference lemma, these imply that the only way (10) and (11) can both hold is if the two
sides of (11) differ by at most O
(
1
T 4
)
.
To summarize: A necessary condition for d1(T ) ≥ n1(T ) + 1 and d2(T ) ≤ n2(T ) + 1 to
occur is that
|f(n1(T ) + 1, n2(T )− 1, . . . , nK(T ))− f(n(T ))| = O
(
1
T 4
)
. (12)
Hence, to prove the Proposition we only need to show that (12) holds at a set of times with
natural density 0. The following lemma proves exactly this property.
Lemma 5. Suppose λ1
λ2
is an irrational number. For positive constants c0, c1, define A(c0, c1)
to be the following set of positive integers:
{t : ∃ q1, q2, . . . , qK ∈ Z+, s.t. |qi − λi · t| ≤ c0,∀i
∧ |f(q1, q2 + 1, . . . , qK)− f(q1 + 1, q2, . . . , qK)| ≤ c1/t4}.
Then A(c0, c1) has natural density zero.
Proof of Lemma 5. The proof relies on the following technical result, which gives a precise
approximation of the discrete partial derivatives of f :
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Lemma 6. Fix the informational environment. There exists a constant aj such that
f(qj, q−j)− f(qj + 1, q−j) =
σ2j · [Qj]11
(qj − aj)2 +O
(
1
t4
; c0
)
(13)
holds for all q1, . . . , qK with |qi−λit| ≤ c0,∀i. The notation O
(
1
t4
; c0
)
means an upper bound
of L
t4
, where the constant L may depend on the informational environment as well as on c0.
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Assuming (13), we see that the condition
|f(q1, q2 + 1, . . . , qK)− f(q1 + 1, q2, . . . , qK)| ≤ c1
t4
implies
∣∣∣σ21 ·[Q1]11(q1−a1)2 − σ22 ·[Q2]11(q2−a2)2 ∣∣∣ ≤ c2t4 and thus ∣∣∣( λ1q1−a1 )2 − ( λ2q2−a2 )2∣∣∣ ≤ c3t4 for some larger positive
constants c2, c3. This further implies
∣∣∣ λ1q1−a1 − λ2q2−a2 ∣∣∣ ≤ c4t3 , which reduces to∣∣∣∣q2 − a2 − λ2λ1 (q1 − a1)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c5t . (14)
This inequality says that the fractional part of λ2
λ1
q1 is very close to the fractional part of
λ2
λ1
a1−a2. But since λ2λ1 is an irrational number, the fractional part of λ2λ1 q1 is “equi-distributed”
in (0,1) as q1 ranges in the positive integers.
46 Thus the Diophantine approximation (14)
only has solution at a set of times t with natural density 0, proving Lemma 5. Below we
supply the technically involved proof of (13).
Proof of Lemma 6. Fix q1, . . . , qK and the signal j. Recall the diagonal matrixD = diag(
q1
σ21
, . . . , qK
σ2K
).
Consider any qˆj ∈ [qj, qj + 1] and let Dˆ be the analogue of D for the division (qˆj, q−j). That
is, Dˆ = D except that [Dˆ]jj =
qˆj
σ2j
. Let Σˆ = CV 0C ′ + Dˆ−1. From (7), we have
∂jf(qˆj, q−j) = −
σ2j
qˆ2j
·
[
V 0C ′Σˆ−1∆jjΣˆ−1CV 0
]
11
. (15)
Here and later in this proof, ∂jf represents the usual continuous derivative rather than the
discrete derivative.
Let D0 = diag
(
λ1t
σ21
, . . . , λKt
σ2K
)
and Σ0 = CV
0C ′ + D−10 . For |qi − λit| ≤ c0,∀i we have
Dˆ −D0 = O(c0), where the Big O notation applies entry-wise. It follows that
Σˆ = CV 0C ′ + Dˆ−1 = CV 0C ′ +D−1 +O(
1
t2
; c0) = Σ0 +O(
1
t2
; c0).
45In applying Lemma 5 to prove Proposition 2, c0 is taken to be the bound on ni − λi · t.
46The Equi-distribution Theorem states that for any irrational number α and any sub-interval (a, b) ⊂
(0, 1), the set of positive integers n such that the fractional part of αn belongs to (a, b) has natural density
b− a. It is a special case of the Ergodic Theorem.
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Observe that the matrix inverse is a differentiable mapping at Σ0 (which is CV
0C ′+D−10 
CV 0C ′ and thus positive definite). Thus we have
Σˆ−1 = Σ−10 +O
(
1
t2
; c0
)
.
Plugging this into (15) and using qˆj ∼ λjt, we obtain that
∂jf(qˆj, q−j) = −
σ2j
qˆ2j
· [V 0C ′Σ−10 ∆jjΣ−10 CV 0]11 +O( 1t4 ; c0
)
. (16)
Since Σ0 = CV
0C ′+ 1
t
·diag
(
σ21
λ1
, . . . ,
σ2K
λK
)
, we can apply Taylor expansion (to the matrix
inverse map) and write
Σ−10 = (CV
0C ′)−1 − 1
t
(CV 0C ′)−1 · diag
(
σ21
λ1
, . . . ,
σ2K
λK
)
· (CV 0C ′)−1 +O
(
1
t2
)
. (17)
This implies
V 0C ′Σ−10 ∆jjΣ
−1
0 CV
0 = V 0C ′(CV 0C ′)−1∆jj(CV 0C ′)−1CV 0 − Mj
t
+O
(
1
t2
)
= Qj − Mj
t
+O
(
1
t2
)
, (18)
where Mj is a fixed K ×K matrix depending only on the informational environment. For
future use, we note that
Mj = V
0C ′(CV 0C ′)−1 diag
(
σ21
λ1
, . . . ,
σ2K
λK
)
(CV 0C ′)−1∆jj(CV 0C ′)−1CV 0
+ V 0C ′(CV 0C ′)−1∆jj(CV 0C ′)−1 diag
(
σ21
λ1
, . . . ,
σ2K
λK
)
(CV 0C ′)−1CV 0
= C−1 diag
(
σ21
λ1
, . . . ,
σ2K
λK
)
(CV 0C ′)−1∆jjC ′−1
+ C−1∆jj(CV 0C ′)−1 diag
(
σ21
λ1
, . . . ,
σ2K
λK
)
C ′−1. (19)
Using (18), we can simplify (16) to
∂jf(qˆj, q−j) = −
σ2j
qˆ2j
·
[
Qj − Mj
t
]
11
+O
(
1
t4
; c0
)
. (20)
Integrating this over qˆj ∈ [qj, qj + 1], we conclude that
f(qj, q−j)− f(qj + 1, q−j) =
σ2j
qj(qj + 1)
·
[
Qj − Mj
t
]
11
+O
(
1
t4
; c0
)
. (21)
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We set aj = −
(
λj ·[Mj ]11
2[Qj ]11
+ 1
2
)
. Then
σ2j
qj(qj + 1)
·
[
Qj − Mj
t
]
11
= (σ2j · [Qj]11) ·
1 +
2aj+1
λjt
qj(qj + 1)
=
σ2j · [Qj]11
(qj − aj)2 +O
(
1
t4
; c0
)
,
implying the desired approximation (13). The last equality above uses
1+
2aj+1
λjt
qj(qj+1)
= 1
(qj−aj)2 +
O
(
1
t4
; c0
)
, which is because
qj(qj + 1)
(qj − aj)2 = 1 +
2(aj + 1)
qj − aj +O
(
1
(qj − aj)2
)
= 1 +
2aj + 1
λjt
+O
(
1
t2
; c0
)
dividing through by qj(qj + 1).
9.6.3 A Simultaneous Diophantine Approximation Problem
The above Lemma 5 tells us that at most times t, there do not exist a pair of divisions
(differing minimally on two signal counts) that lead to posterior variances close to each
other (with a difference of c1
t4
). We obtain a stronger result if a triple of such divisions were
to exist.
Lemma 7. Fix V 0 and C, and let signal variances vary. For positive constants c0, c1, define
A∗(c0, c1) to be the following set of positive integers:
{t : ∃ q1, q2, q3, . . . , qK ∈ Z+, s.t. |qi − λit| ≤ c0,∀i
∧ |f(q1, q2 + 1, q3, . . . , qK)− f(q1 + 1, q2, q3, . . . , qK)| ≤ c1/t4
∧ |f(q1, q2, q3 + 1, . . . , qK)− f(q1 + 1, q2, q3, . . . , qK)| ≤ c1/t4}
Then, for generic signal variances, A∗(c0, c1) has finite cardinality.
Proof. So far we have been dealing with fixed informational environments. However, a
number of parameters defined above depend on the signal variances σ = {σ2i }Ki=1. Specifically,
while the matrix Qi = C
−1∆iiC ′−1 is independent of σ, the asymptotic proportions λi ∝
σi · [Qi]11 do vary with σ. In this proof, we write λi(σ) to highlight this dependence.
Next, we recall the matrix Mj introduced earlier in (19). We note that for fixed matrices
V 0 and C, each entry of Mj(σ) is a fixed linear combination of
σ21
λ1(σ)
, . . . ,
σ2K
λK(σ)
.
Then, the parameter aj(σ) in (13) is given by (see the previous proof)
aj(σ) = −1
2
− λj(σ) · [Mj(σ)]11
2[Qj]11
= −1
2
+ λj(σ)
K∑
i=1
b˜ji
σ2i
λi(σ)
= −1
2
+
K∑
i=1
bjiσiσj (22)
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for some constants b˜ji, bji independent of σ. In the last equality above, we used the fact that
λj(σ)
λi(σ)
equals a constant times
σj
σi
.
Thus Lemma 6 gives
f(qj, q−j)− f(qj + 1, q−j) =
σ2j · [Qj]11
(qj − aj(σ))2 +O
(
1
t4
; c0
)
whenever |qi − λi(σ) · t| ≤ c0,∀i. We comment that the Big O constant here may depend
on σ. However, a single constant suffices if we restrict each σi to be bounded above and
bounded away from zero. Since measure-zero sets are closed under countable unions, this
restriction does not affect the result we want to prove.
By the above approximation, a necessary condition for t ∈ A∗(c0, c1) is that q1, q2, q3
satisfy ∣∣∣∣(q2 − a2(σ))− η · σ2σ1 (q1 − a1(σ))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c6q1 (23)
as well as ∣∣∣∣(q3 − a3(σ))− κ · σ3σ1 (q1 − a1(σ))
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c6q1 (24)
for some constant c6 independent of σ (c6 may depend on c0, c1 stated in the lemma). The
constant η is given by η =
√
[Q2]11/[Q1]11, and similarly for κ.
It remains to show that for generic σ, there are only finitely many positive integer triples
(q1, q2, q3) satisfying the simultaneous Diophantine approximation (23) and (24). To prove
this, we assume that each σi is i.i.d. drawn from the uniform distribution on [
1
L
, L], where L
is a large constant. Denote by F (q1, q2, q3) the event that (23) and (24) hold simultaneously.
We claim that there exists a constant c7 such that P(F (q1, q2, q3)) ≤ c7q41 holds for all q1, q2, q3.
Since F (q1, q2, q3) cannot occur for q2, q3 > c8q1, this claim will imply∑
q1,q2,q3
P(F (q1, q2, q3)) <
∑
q1
∑
q2,q3≤c8q1
c7
q41
<
∑
q1
c7c
2
8
q21
<∞. (25)
Generic finiteness of tuples (q1, q2, q3) will then follow from the Borel-Cantelli Lemma.
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To prove this claim, it suffices to show that if σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4, . . . , σK) and σ
′ =
(σ1, σ
′
2, σ
′
3, σ4, . . . , σK) both satisfy (23) and (24), then |σ2 − σ′2|, |σ3 − σ′3| ≤ cq21 for some
47Because of the use of Borel-Cantelli Lemma, this proof (unlike Lemma 5 above) does not allow us to
effectively determine for given σ whether (23) and (24) only have finitely many integer solutions. Nonetheless,
a modification of this proof does imply the following finite-time probabilistic statement: when σ1, . . . , σK
are independently drawn, the probability that the optimality strategy coincides with t-optimality at every
period t ≥ T is at least 1−O( 1T ), where the constant involved only depends on the distribution of σ.
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constant c.48 Without loss, we assume |σ2 − σ′2| ≥ |σ3 − σ′3|. Using (22), we can rewrite the
condition (23) as ∣∣∣∣ (q2 + 12
)
− η · σ2
σ1
(
q1 +
1
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+
∑
i
βiσ2σi︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c6q1
for some constants βi independent of σ. A similar inequality holds at σ
′:∣∣∣∣ (q2 + 12
)
− η · σ
′
2
σ1
(
q1 +
1
2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A′
+
∑
i
βiσ
′
2σ
′
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
B′
∣∣∣∣ ≤ c6q1 .
It follows from the above two inequalities that |A+B − A′ −B′| ≤ 2c6
q1
. Furthermore, since
|A− A′| ≤ |A+B − A′ −B′|+ |B −B′| (by triangle inequality), we deduce∣∣∣∣η · (σ′2 − σ2)σ1 ·
(
q1 +
1
2
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2c6q1 +
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
βi(σ
′
2σ
′
i − σ2σi)
∣∣∣∣∣ . (26)
Because σ′i = σi for i 6= 2, 3, we have∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
βi(σ
′
2σ
′
i − σ2σi)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i
βi(σ
′
2 − σ2)σi +
∑
i
βiσ
′
2(σ
′
i − σi)
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣
(∑
i
βi(σ
′
2 − σ2)σi
)
+ β2σ
′
2(σ
′
2 − σ2) + β3σ′2(σ′3 − σ3)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ (K + 2)L ·max
i
|βi| · |σ′2 − σ2| .
Plugging this estimate into (26), we obtain the desired result |σ2− σ′2| ≤ cq21 . This completes
the proof of the lemma.
9.6.4 Monotonicity of t-Optimal Divisions
We apply Lemma 7 to prove the eventual monotonicity of t-optimal divisions in generic
informational environments.
Proposition 3. Fix V 0 and C. For generic signal variances {σ2i }Ki=1, there exists T0 such
that for t ≥ T0, the t-optimal division n(t) is unique, and it satisfies ni(t+ 1) ≥ ni(t),∀i.
48This implies that the probability of the event F (q1, q2, q3) conditional on any value of σ1, σ4, . . . , σK is
bounded by c7
q41
, which is stronger than the claim.
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Proof. Uniqueness follows from the stronger fact that in generic informational environments,
f(q1, . . . , qK) differs from f(q
′
1, . . . , q
′
K) whenever q 6= q′. Below we focus on monotonicity.
Using the order difference lemma, we can already deduce the difference |ni(t+ 1)−ni(t)|
is no more than 1 at sufficiently late periods t. Suppose that n1(t + 1) = n1(t) − 1. Then
because
∑
i(ni(t + 1) − ni(t)) = 1, we can without loss assume n2(t + 1) = n2(t) + 1 and
n3(t+ 1) = n3(t) + 1.
For notational ease, write ni = ni(t), n
′
i = ni(t+ 1). By t-optimality, we have
f(n1, n2, n3, . . . , nK) ≤ f(n1 − 1, n2 + 1, n3, . . . , nK)
f(n′1, n
′
2, n
′
3, . . . , n
′
K) ≤ f(n′1 + 1, n′2 − 1, n′3, . . . , n′K)
These inequalities are equivalent to
∂2f(n1 − 1, n2, n3, . . . , nK) ≥ ∂1f(n1 − 1, n2, n3, . . . , nK) (27)
∂2f(n
′
1, n
′
2 − 1, n′3, . . . , n′K) ≤ ∂1f(n′1, n′2 − 1, n′3, . . . , n′K) (28)
with ∂if representing the discrete partial derivative.
Since n′2 − 1 = n2, the LHS of (28) is at least the LHS of (27) minus a number of cross
partials. Similarly, the RHS of (28) is at most bigger than the RHS of (27) by a number
of cross partials. Thus the only way (27) and (28) can both hold is if the two sides of (27)
differ by no more than O( 1
t4
). That is, for some absolute constant c1,
49 we have
|f(n1 − 1, n2 + 1, n3, . . . , nK)− f(n1, n2, n3, . . . , nK)| ≤ c1
t4
. (29)
An analogous argument yields
|f(n1 − 1, n2, n3 + 1, . . . , nK)− f(n1, n2, n3, . . . , nK)| ≤ c1
t4
. (30)
But now we can apply Lemma 7 to show that in generic environments, there are only finitely
many integer tuples (n1, . . . , nK) that satisfy both (29) and (30). This proves the result.
9.6.5 Completing the Proof of Theorem 3
By Proposition 3, generically there exists T0 such that n(t) is monotonic in t after T0 periods.
Thus, using our dynamic Blackwell lemma, if the DM achieves t-optimality at some period
t ≥ T0, he will continue to do so in the future. By Proposition 2, such a time t does exist.
This proves Theorem 3.
49As discussed in the proof of Lemma 7, we can find a single constant c1 that works for all σ bounded
above and bounded away from zero.
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9.7 Proof of Proposition 1 (Bound on B)
9.7.1 Preliminary Estimates
Throughout, we work with the linearly-transformed model, where each signal Xi is simply
θ˜i plus standard Gaussian noise, and the DM’s prior covariance matrix over the transformed
states is V˜ . Let γ = γ(q1, . . . , qK) represent the following K × 1 vector:
γ = (V˜ + E)−1 · V˜ · w (31)
with E = diag( 1
q1
, . . . , 1
qK
). For 1 ≤ i ≤ K, γi denotes the i-th coordinate of γ.
Here we re-derive the posterior variance function f , its (usual continuous) derivatives and
second derivatives. Our formulae below take as primitives V˜ and w, but they are equivalent
to those presented in Appendix 9.1 (for the original model).
Fact 1 (Posterior Variance). f(q1, . . . , qK) = w
′(V˜ − V˜ (V˜ + E)−1V˜ )w.
Fact 2 (Partial Derivatives of Posterior Variance). ∂if(q1, . . . , qK) = − 1q2i ·w
′V˜ (V˜+E)−1∆ii(V˜+
E)−1V˜ w = −γ2i
q2i
.
Fact 3 (Second-Order Partial Derivatives of Posterior Variance).
∂iif(q1, . . . , qK)
=
2 · w′V˜ (V˜ + E)−1∆ii(V˜ + E)−1V˜ w
q3i
− 2 · w
′V˜ (V˜ + E)−1∆ii(V˜ + E)−1∆ii(V˜ + E)−1V˜ w
q4i
=
2γ2i
q3i
·
(
1− [(V˜ + E)
−1]ii
qi
)
Fact 4 (Cross-Partial Derivatives of Posterior Variance).
∂ijf(q1, . . . , qK) =
−2
q2i q
2
j
· w′V˜ (V˜ + E)−1∆ii(V˜ + E)−1∆jj(V˜ + E)−1V˜ w
=
−2γiγj
q2i q
2
j
· [(V˜ + E)−1]ij.
All of the above facts can be proved by simple linear algebra, so we omit the details.
9.7.2 Refined Asymptotic Characterization of n(t)
We now specialize to w = 1 and establish the next lemma, which refines our asymptotic
characterization of n(t) in Appendix 9.3.50 Proposition 1 will immediately follow.
50Easy to see that in the transformed model, λi ∝ |wi|. So λi = 1K here.
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Lemma 8. For t ≥ 8(R + 1)K√K, it holds that |ni(t)− tK | ≤ 4(R + 1)
√
K.
Proof. Note from (31) that (V˜ + E)γ = V˜ w. So V˜ (w − γ) = Eγ = (γ1
q1
, . . . , γK
qK
)′, and
w − γ = (V˜ )−1 ·
(
γ1
q1
, . . . ,
γK
qK
)′
.
From the definition of the operator norm, we deduce
K∑
i=1
(1− γi)2 = ‖w − γ‖2 ≤ R2 ·
(
K∑
j=1
γ2j
q2j
)
. (32)
This holds for any division vector q and the corresponding γ (which is a function of q).
Now suppose without loss of generality that n1(t) ≥ tK . Let q = (n1(t)−1, n2(t), . . . , nK(t))
and consider the corresponding γ. Then from t-optimality we have
|f(q1 + 1, q−1)− f(q)| ≥ |f(qj + 1, q−j)− f(q)|, ∀j.
Note that the discrete partial derivatives above are related to the usual continuous partials
by the following inequalities:51
γ2j
qj(qj + 1)
≤ |f(qj + 1, q−j)− f(q)| ≤
γ2j
q2j
.
We therefore deduce
γ21
q21
≥ γ
2
j
qj(qj + 1)
, ∀j. (33)
Combining (32) and (33) and using 1
q2j
≤ 2
qj(qj+1)
, we see that
K∑
i=1
(1− γi)2 ≤ 2R2K · γ
2
1
q21
. (34)
In particular, we know that γ1 − 1 ≤ R
√
2K · γ1
q1
. Easy to see this implies
γ1 ≤ 1 + 2R
√
K
q1
≤
√
2 (35)
whenever q1 = n1(t) − 1 ≥ tK − 1 ≥ (2
√
2 + 2)R
√
K. Plugging this back into the RHS of
(34), we then obtain
γj ≥ 1− 2R
√
K
q1
≥ 2−
√
2. (36)
51The RHS follows from the convexity of f ; the LHS can be proved by using Fact 2, Fact 3 and noting
that γ2j is an increasing function in qj , because
∂γj(q)
∂qj
=
γj
q2j
· [(V + E)−1]jj has the same sign of γj .
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Now use (33), (35) and (36) to deduce that
qj + 1 ≥ γj
γ1
· q1 ≥
1− 2R
√
K
q1
1 + 2R
√
K
q1
· q1 ≥
(
1− 4R
√
K
q1
)
· q1 = q1 − 4R
√
K.
Recall qj = nj(t) for j > 1 and q1 = n1(t)− 1. We thus have
nj(t) ≥ n1(t)− 4R
√
K − 2. (37)
Since n1(t) ≥ tK , the above implies nj(t) ≥ tK − 4(R + 1)
√
K for each signal j. This proves
half of the lemma.
For the other half, note that nj(t) ≤ tK must hold for some signal j. Thus (37) yields
n1(t) ≤ tK + 4(R+ 1)
√
K. This is not just true for signal 1, but in fact for any signal i with
ni(t) ≥ tK . So we conclude ni(t) ≤ tK + 4(R + 1)
√
K for each signal i. The proof of the
lemma is complete.
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10 Online Appendix
10.1 Applications of Results from Section 5 (Multi-player Games)
10.1.1 Beauty Contest
Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) introduced a beauty contest game with endogenous one-shot
information acquisition. We build on this by modifying the information acquisition stage
so that players sequentially acquire information over many periods (rather than once), and
face a capacity constraint each period (rather than costly signals). We show that the basic
insights of Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) hold in this setting.
Specifically, suppose that at an unknown final period, a unit mass of players simultane-
ously chooses prices pi ∈ R to minimize the (normalized) squared distance between their
price and an unknown target price p∗, which depends on the unknown state ω and also on
the average price p =
∫
pi di:
ui(pi, p, ω) = − 1
(1− r)2 · (pi − p
∗)2 where p∗ = (1− r) · ω + r · p. (38)
The constant r ∈ (−1, 1) determines whether pricing decisions are complements or substi-
tutes.52
In every period up until the final period, each player acquires B signals from the set
(X ik), as in the framework we have developed. To closely mirror the setup in Hellwig and
Veldkamp (2009), we set each θi1 = ω. Assuming “conditional independence” of players’
signals, we can directly apply Corollary 1 and conclude that in every equilibrium, players
choose a deterministic (myopic) sequence of information acquisitions. This result echoes
Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), who show that equilibrium is unique when players choose
from private signals (see their Subsection 1.3.4).53 Our extension is to introduce dynamics
and show how the dynamic problem can be reduced into a static one.
Let Σ(t) be the posterior variance about ω after the first t myopic observations. Since the
players in our model acquire B signals each period, their (common) posterior variance at the
52When r > 0, best responses are increasing in the prices set by other players, thus decisions are comple-
ments. Conversely, r < 0 implies decisions are substitutes.
53Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009) also study a case in which players observe signals that are distorted by
a common noise (which violates conditional independence). They show that multiple equilibria generally
arise with such “public signals”. Dewan and Myatt (2008), Myatt and Wallace (2012) and Colombo et al.
(2014) restore a unique linear symmetric equilibrium by assuming perfectly divisible signals, similar to the
continuous-time variant of our model. In contrast, our equilibrium analysis relies on the informational
environment (i.e. conditional independence), but not on symmetry or linearity of the strategy.
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end of t periods is given by Σ(Bt). Thus, conditional on period t being the final period, our
game is as if the players acquire a batch of Bt signals and then choose prices. This means
that equilibrium prices are determined in the same way as in Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009):
p(I i≤Bt) =
1− r
1− r + r · Σ(Bt) · E(ω|I
i
≤Bt), (39)
where I i≤Bt represents player i’s information set, consisting of Bt signal realizations.
We can use this characterization of equilibrium to re-evaluate the main insight in Hellwig
and Veldkamp (2009): the incentive to acquire more informative signals is increasing in
aggregate information acquisition if decisions are complements and decreasing if decisions
are substitutes. For this purpose, we augment the model with a period 0, in which each
player i invests in a capacity level Bi at some cost. Afterwards, players acquire information
myopically (under possibly differential capacity constraints) and participate in the beauty
contest game.
Let µ ∈ ∆(Z+) be the distribution over capacity levels chosen by player i’s opponents.
Then, player i’s expected utility from choosing capacity Bi is given by
EU(Bi, µ) = −Et∼pi
[
Σ(Bit)(
1− r + r · ∫
B
Σ(Bt) dµ(B)
)2
]
.
Above, the expectation is taken with respect to the random final period t distributed ac-
cording to pi, while inside the expectation, the term
∫
B
Σ(Bt) dµ(B) is the average posterior
variance among the players. Similar to Proposition 1 in Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009), we
have the following result:
Corollary 5. Suppose Bˆi > Bi and µˆ > µ in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
Then the sign of the difference EU(Bi, µ) + EU(Bˆi, µˆ)− EU(Bi, µˆ)− EU(Bˆi, µ) is
(a) zero, if there is no strategic interaction (r = 0);
(b) positive, if decisions are complementary (r > 0);
(c) negative, if decisions are substitutes (r < 0).
When decisions are complements, the value of additional information is increasing in the
amount of aggregate information. Thus player i has a stronger incentive to choose a higher
signal capacity if his opponents (on average) acquire more signals. This incentive goes in
the opposite direction when decisions are substitutes, which confirms the main finding of
Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009).
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10.1.2 Strategic Trading
We consider the strategic trading game introduced in Lambert et al. (2018), in which indi-
viduals trade given asymmetric information about the value of an asset. We endogenize the
information available to traders by adding a pre-trading stage in which traders sequentially
acquire signals. As before, we suppose that trading occurs at a final time period that is
determined according to an arbitrary full-support distribution.
In more detail: At the final time period, a security with unknown value v is traded in a
market, and each of n traders submits a demand di. There are additionally liquidity traders
who generate exogenous random demand u. A market-maker privately observes a signal
θM (possibly multi-dimensional) and the total demand D =
∑
i di + u. He sets the price
P (θM , D), which in equilibrium equals E[v | θM , D]. Each strategic trader then obtains profit
Πi = di · (v − P (θM , D)).
We suppose that in each period up to and including the final time period, each trader i
chooses to observe a signal from his set (X ik) (described in Section 5). The requirement of
conditional independence is strengthened to apply to a payoff-relevant vector ω = (v, θM , u)
(instead of a real-valued unknown): That is, for each player i, conditional on the value of θi1,
the payoff-relevant vector ω and the other players’ unknown states (θj)j 6=i are assumed to
be conditionally independent from player i’s states θi. Relative to the fully general setting
considered in Lambert et al. (2018), this assumption allows for flexible correlation within a
player’s signals, but places a strong restriction on the correlation across different players’
signals. Applying Corollary 1, we can conclude that:
Corollary 6. Under the above assumptions, there is an essentially unique linear NE in
which the on-path signal acquisitions are myopic, and in the final period, players play the
unique linear equilibrium described in Lambert et al. (2018).
Thus, the closed-form solutions that are a key contribution of Lambert et al. (2018)
extend to our dynamic setting with endogenous information.
10.2 Example in Which n(t) is Not Monotone Even for Large t
Here we continue to study Example 2 presented in Figure 1 of the main text. We will show
that the t-optimal division vectors n(t) fail to be monotone, even when we consider only
periods after some large T .
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The posterior variance function is
f(q1, q2, q3) = 1− 1
1 + 1
q1
+ 1− 1
1+ 1
q2
+ 1
1+q3
This suggests that the t-optimal problem can be separated into two parts: choosing q1, and
allocating the remaining observations between q2 and q3. The latter allocation problem is
simple: an optimal division satisfies q3 = q2 − 1 or q3 = q2. With some extra algebra, we
obtain that for N ≥ 1:
1. If t = 3N + 1, then the unique t-optimal division is (N + 2, N,N − 1);
2. If t = 3N + 2, then the unique t-optimal division is (N + 3, N,N − 1);
3. If t = 3N + 3, then the unique t-optimal division is (N + 2, N + 1, N).
Crucially, note that when transitioning from t = 3N + 2 to t = 3N + 3, the t-optimal
number of X1 signals is decreased. This reflects the complementarity between signals X2
and X3, which causes the DM to observe them in pairs. Due to this failure of monotonicity,
a sequential rule cannot achieve the t-optimal division vectors for all large t.
10.3 Additional Result for K = 2
When there are only two states and two signals, we can show that for a broad class of
environments, the myopic information acquisition strategy is optimal from period 1.54
Proposition 4. Suppose K = 2, the prior is standard Gaussian (V 0 = I2), and both signals
have variance 1.55 Write C =
(
a b
c d
)
and assume without loss that |ad| ≥ |bc|. Then the
optimal information acquisition strategy is myopic whenever the following inequality holds:
(1 + 2b2) · |ad− bc| ≥ |ad+ bc|. (40)
In particular, this is true whenever abcd ≤ 0.
To interpret, (40) requires that the determinant of the matrix C, ad − bc, is not too small
(holding other terms constant). Equivalently, the two vectors (in R2) defining the signals
should not be close to collinear. This rules out situations where the two signals provide such
similar information in the initial periods that they substitute one another.
54In the proposition below, if the linear coefficients a, b, c, d were picked at random, then with probability
1
2 we would have abcd ≤ 0.
55We make these simplifying assumptions so that the condition for immediate equivalence is easy to state
and interpret.
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Proof. Under the assumptions, the DM’s posterior variance about θ1 is computed to be
f(q1, q2) =
1 + b2q1 + d
2q2
1 + (a2 + b2)q1 + (c2 + d2)q2 + (ad− bc)2q1q2 .
Given qi observations of each signal i in the past, the myopic strategy chooses signal 1 if and
only if f(q1 + 1, q2) < f(q1, q2 + 1), which reduces to
(ad− bc)2b2q21 + (1 + b2)(ad− bc)2q1 − (a2d2 − b2c2)q1 + c2(1 + b2)
<(ad− bc)2d2q22 + (1 + d2)(ad− bc)2q2 + (a2d2 − b2c2)q2 + a2(1 + d2)
(41)
The condition |ad| ≥ |bc| ensures that the RHS is an increasing function of q2, because the
coefficients in front of q22 and q2 are both positive. Meanwhile, the condition (1 + 2b
2)|ad−
bc| ≥ |ad + bc| implies the LHS is larger when q1 = 1 than when q1 = 0, so that the LHS is
also increasing in (integer values of) q1.
Even if f may not be written into separable form, (41) suggests that the comparison
between the marginal values of signal 1 and 2 “is separable.” It follows that the t-optimal
division vectors are increasing in t. Proposition 4 is proved.
10.4 Eventual Optimality of the Myopic Strategy
Below, write m(t) for the division vector at time t achieved under the (history-independent)
myopic rule.56 We have discussed that when Theorems 1 or 2 apply, the myopic division
vector m(t) is t-optimal at every period t. In this appendix, we argue that generically,
division vectors m(t) at late periods are t-optimal. This result complements our Theorem
3, and suggests that a DM who naively follows the myopic rule all the way cannot do very
poorly.
To avoid repetition, here we only sketch the core argument. The main new step is to show
that the division vectors m(t) under the myopic rule grow to infinity in each coordinate; that
is, a myopic DM would not get stuck observing a subset of signals. Once this is shown, we
can repeat the (rest of the) proof of Lemma 4 and deduce that mi(t)−λi ·t remains bounded.
And with these asymptotic characterizations, we can reproduce the proof of Theorem 3 (now
for the myopic strategy instead of the optimal strategy) without trouble.57
To see myopic signal choices never get stuck, we establish the following lemma.
56That is, m(t) = (m1(t), . . . ,mK(t)) where mi(t) is the number of times signal i has been observed under
myopic information acquisition prior to and including period t.
57These latter steps are actually simpler to carry out for the myopic strategy. This is because in construct-
ing a deviation from the myopic strategy, we only need to look for a lower posterior variance at a single
period. So we no longer need to make use of switch deviations.
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Lemma 9. Fix an arbitrary division vector q ∈ RK+ (need not be integral). The partial
derivatives of f at q are all zero if and only if q1 = · · · = qK =∞.
Intuitively, this holds because for normal linear signals, the posterior variance is globally
convex. So if each signal has zero marginal value relative to the division q, then q must be
a global minimizer of posterior variance.
We conclude by mentioning that a similar result (i.e. myopic information acquisition does
not get stuck) would not in general be true for other signal structures. The following is a
counterexample with normal but non-linear signals.
Example 3. Consider three states θ1, θ2, θ3 drawn independently. The DM has access to these
three signals:
X1 = θ1 + sign(θ2) + 1
X2 = sign(θ2θ3) + 2
X3 = θ3 + 3
where 1, 2, 3 are Gaussian noise terms. We focus on the prediction problem, in which (at
a random time) the DM makes a prediction about θ1 and receives negative of the squared
prediction error.
Note that prior to the first observation of X2, signal X3 is completely uninformative
about the payoff-relevant state θ1 (even when combined with previous observations of X1).
Similarly, signal X2 is individually uninformative about θ2,
58 and thus about θ1. These imply
that the DM’s uncertainty about θ1 is not reduced upon the first observation of either X2 or
X3. Hence, the myopic rule in this example is to always observe X1, contrary to Lemma 9.
Thus, if the DM acquires information myopically, he will never completely learn the value
of θ1. By contrast, if the DM is sufficiently patient, then his optimal strategy will observe
each signal infinitely often and identify the value of θ1 in the long run. Thus, in this example
the myopic signal path does not eventually agree with the optimal path.
58This is because the sign of θ2θ3 does not contain any new information about θ2 when θ3 is equally likely
to be positive or negative.
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